More Bad Arguments

 I have serious issues with the existence of bad arguments. Especially, ones that are considered persuasive by large swaths of people who've never critically examined its structure and merit. One such argument is called "The Fine Tuning Argument" for God's existence. I truly cannot understand why this is persuasive to anyone who isn't already a theist. I actually don't really even understand why it's persuasive to theists at all. Let's take a look at the argument by first faithfully reconstructing its most common variant. Then I'll explain why it's essentially a vacuous tautology. 

Steelman (Abductive / IBE version) of the Fine-Tuning Argument:

• P1 (Observation): The fundamental physical constants and initial conditions of the universe are such that they fall within a very narrow life-permitting range i.e., they are "finely tuned" for life.
• P2 (Low Prior on Naturalism): The probability of this fine-tuning occurring under a naturalistic, non-designed universe (chance or necessity) is extremely low.
• P3 (Higher Prior on Theism): The probability of a life-permitting universe is not nearly so low on the hypothesis that the universe was created by a theistic God who values life.
• C (IBE): Therefore, the existence of a finely tuned, life-permitting universe is evidence that favors theism over naturalism; theism is the better explanation of the data.

This is a form of reasoning called "Abductive Reasoning" . It is a form of inference that seeks the most likely explanation given a set of observations. It's a form of plausible reasoning that reasons backwards from a set of observations to a conclusion of the most likely hypothesis that explains the data. It is very similar to Bayesian inference, or inverse problems more generally. In Bayesian inference, we have a collection of data D and a set of parameters (theta1,theta2,...); the inferential task is to identify which parameter generated that data. Since we don't have knowledge of the true generating distribution, we must infer the most probable value of the parameter, given our uncertainty and total evidence. I said it is similar to Bayesian reasoning, because we actually can't assign probabilities in the case of abductive reasoning. The conclusion of an abductive argument is "best explains" the data or "is the most plausible explanation", which is crucially different from a probability. However, this does not stop people from assigning "epistemic probabilities"; which are relations between propositions. For now, it's just important to recognize the direction of inference and the qualification we must assign to the conclusion. All too often, people misunderstand this argument structure as "demonstrating" the conclusion, but I cannot stress how incorrect that is. 

Douglas Walton's work on abductive reasoning, also known as inference to the best explanation, presents a structured argumentation scheme that outlines how such reasoning typically works in everyday and scientific contexts. He also provides a set of critical questions used to evaluate abductive arguments and identifies hidden assumptions implicit in the scheme. Below is a full, comprehensive presentation of these elements based on Walton’s formalization, especially from his books like Abductive Reasoning (2004) and Argumentation Schemes (co-authored with Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, 2008).

Abductive Reasoning and Critical Questions

1. F is a set of facts or observations (data to be explained).
2. E is a hypothesis or explanation that would, if true, explain F.
3. No alternative hypothesis explains F as well as E does.
4. Therefore, E is (plausibly) true.

Walton provides critical questions to test the plausibility, completeness, and robustness of the inference:

• CQ1: What other explanations of the given facts have been considered? Is E the only plausible explanation, or are there credible alternatives?
• CQ2: How well does the hypothesis E explain the facts F? Is E actually a good fit, or only a weak/partial explanation?
• CQ3: Is E consistent with other known facts? Does E contradict any well-established knowledge?
• CQ4: Is there evidence that confirms E independently of F? Can E be independently verified or supported outside of the initial data F?
• CQ5: How robust is E compared to alternative explanations in terms of simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power? Does E stand out by being simpler, more elegant, or more comprehensive than rivals?
• CQ6: Could new evidence undermine E or support an alternative hypothesis? Is E susceptible to future falsification or new competing data?

These assumptions are not stated explicitly in the scheme but are necessary for the reasoning to work as an argument:

1. Completeness Assumption: All plausible alternative explanations have been considered. (But in practice, we may not have exhausted the hypothesis space.)
2. Best Explanation Assumption: There is a meaningful standard for evaluating which explanation is “best.” (Involves implicit criteria like simplicity, scope, coherence, and testability.)
3. Stability Assumption: The data (F) is accurate and will not change significantly. (If F is faulty, the whole inference can collapse.)
4. Non-defeasibility (tentative): That no future information will overturn the current best explanation. (Yet abductive reasoning is inherently defeasible—it is always provisional.)
5. Rational Choice Assumption: That the evaluator is reasoning rationally and fairly comparing alternatives.
6. Causal Sufficiency Assumption: That the best explanation captures the true causal mechanism behind the facts.
7. Contextual Appropriateness Assumption: Assumes the abductive framework is appropriate for the domain. For instance, scientific abduction differs in standards from legal or medical contexts. What counts as a “best explanation” is context-sensitive.

Keep all of this in mind because much of this will become relevant when we start considering why the argument is incredibly weak. Of course, the other requirements for argument analysis are applicable; defining terms, vagueness, ambiguity, equivocation, etc. For example, what is even meant by "Fine Tuning"? What interpretation of "Probability" does the argument assume? 

Back to the argument. It is trying to establish a few things. First, The argument hinges not just on improbability, but on explanatory power: theism is claimed to predict or at least make likely the observed life-permitting conditions, while naturalism allegedly does not. Second, The "probability is higher on the hypothesis of theism" is crucial, and defenders like Francis Collins argue this with reference to Bayesian confirmation theory.

First objection

So my first contention is that we have no idea what the life permitting probability distribution would look like for various parameter combinations of the physical constants (Key word, constant! More on that later). This is mainly because we have no good definition of "life"; we dont know the conditions under which "life" can emerge. The argument assumes "the form of life we are familiar with" but even that is a stretch. This is technically two arguments; unclear definitions of "life" and equivocation of the term "probability". Lets unpack this a bit more.

First, when proponents of the fine-tuning argument say, “the probability of this configuration is vanishingly small”, they are implicitly making assumptions about the space of possible constants, the range those constants can take, and the probability measure that is being applied across that space. But the issue is that Physics gives us no canonical probability distribution over physical constants. There is no objective way (currently) to say that a particular value is more or less likely than another, because constants like the gravitational constant or fine-structure constant are just that; constants. They don’t vary across trials; we only have one observed value. The fine-tuning argument often assumes a uniform distribution over a huge range (e.g., ±10^60 of a parameter), but there's no justification for choosing that distribution. Why uniform? Why that range? Why not a peaked distribution? The assumption is arbitrary.

We have no defined probability measure over possible universes. To say something is improbable, we need a probability distribution over possible values, and we don't have one. In ordinary probability, to say that event X is unlikely, we must have a well-defined sample space with a probability measure over it. But in the case with physical constants, we don't know the range of possible constants, whether all values are equally likely or follow some unknown rule, and we don't know whether the constants had to be what they are due to unknown deeper physical laws. Since no natural probability measure exists over these constants, claims that their values are “improbable” are completely unjustified. Because we have no well-defined probability distribution, fine-tuning proponents are making a statistical claim without a valid statistical foundation. If someone says "The probability of getting a life-permitting universe is 1 in 10^20, therefore it's highly unlikely!", we could as:

• Where did you get that number? (It is often arbitrarily chosen.)
• What is the total space of possible universes? (We do not know.)
• What is the probability measure over that space? (No one has a justified answer.)
• Could deeper physics constrain the values? (Possibly, making fine-tuning irrelevant.)

Since fine-tuning arguments rely on completely speculative probabilities, they fail to make a rigorous case for design. The argument is statistically meaningless unless we can specify this distribution.

This might be one of the most pernicious aspects of this argument. It crucially depends on a fallacy of equivocation. Many people don't know this but there are quite a few different interpretations of probability. One of which is the "objective", frequency based probability interpretation. Another is the "philosophical" probability interpretation, that sees "probability" as a relation between propositions, not actual events occurring in the world. There is a shell game people play; they switch between these two different sense. They start with an objective sounding claim: "It's incredibly unlikely to get life permitting constants, 1 in a trillion trillion!". When pressed “We don’t really know the probability distribution, it’s just epistemically improbable that they’d be just right by chance", (often not making this distinction explicit). Then they use that epistemic sense to argue for some scientifically sounding objective conclusion: “Therefore, the best explanation is that they were chosen by a designer.” Just because we find a set of parameters unexpected under naturalism doesn’t mean they are actually unlikely. Without an objective probability distribution, we can't infer that fine-tuning is even a real phenomenon; let alone that it needs explanation. You cant assign probabilities without a reference class. In cosmology, we don’t have access to multiple universes or even a theoretical distribution over them (unless we accept speculative multiverse models). "Epistemic Probabilities" are contaminated by anthropocentrism. Our intuition about what is "surprising" is based on human bias and lack of knowledge. These reflect ignorance more than insight. 

Second, the fine-tuning argument tends to reify one kind of carbon-based, water-dependent life, essentially, us. But this leads to multiple issues. It assumes that only life like ours is worth explaining, rather than exploring the possibility that radically different forms of life (e.g., based on silicon, plasma, non-local structures, etc.) could emerge under different constants. There is deep anthropic circularity. The argument says "these constants are finely tuned for us", but we are necessarily only able to observe a universe where beings like us can exist. So it's not surprising that we find ourselves in such a universe, any observers would. This is the Weak Anthropic Principle, and many argue that it undermines the need for further explanation. There are also way too many unknown unknowns. We don’t know the full space of physical possibilities, nor do we understand how biochemistry, complexity, or consciousness would behave under different constants. So declaring that only a tiny sliver of parameter space allows "life" is mind-numbingly speculative.

We lack a well-defined, principled probability space and a robust, general definition of "life"; this undermines the epistemic foundation of the fine-tuning inference. The fine-tuning argument purports to evaluate P(fine-tuning | naturalism), but we dont have the tools to meaningfully assign that probability. That makes the abductive move (that theism better predicts fine-tuning) deeply questionable, because the evidence itself is not well-defined.

Second Objection

My second contention is the assumption that the probability is higher under theism. I think this is highly speculative and very possibly demonstrably false. If god is the creator of the universe, he created everything ex nihilo, including the fundamental constants. This means, presumably god could have created the universe with a different set of fundamental constants that are completely unknown to us. So the possibility space is much larger apriori. Under naturalism, the probability will be determined by the various combinations of the existing constants. Under theism, god could have created an entirely set of fundamental constants. So for naturalism, suppose there are N constants and assume they take real values for simplicity in the range (0,5). Lets assume 10 fundamental constants. This will be 5^10, which is obviously very large. But these constants are taken as given under naturalism. Under theism, there could be 20 fundamental constants, 100 fundamental constants, and entirely different permuations of each constant etc. God is under no obligation to create a universe like the one we observe with the particular constants; and is under no obligation for the constants to have the specific causal powers our observed ones currently have. Therefore, the possibility space must necessarily be strictly larger than what we observe, and hence the probability must be drastically smaller given that we have no reason to expect why god would instantiate one set of fundamental constants over another. Lets clean this up, putting it in premise format:

• Premise: The Fine-Tuning Argument assumes that the probability of a life-permitting universe is higher under theism than under naturalism.

That assumption is false or at least unmotivated, because:

1. Under naturalism, the possibility space is limited by a fixed set of physical constants (e.g., N constants with values in some defined range).
2. Under theism, God is unconstrained: God could have instantiated entirely different physics; new constants, different numbers of dimensions, alternate laws, etc.
3. Therefore, the space of possibilities under theism is vastly larger, since God’s freedom allows for any consistent metaphysical framework.
4. Hence, the probability of our universe (with these constants) under theism is actually lower, not higher, it's a smaller target in a vastly larger space.

This is a kind of inverse Occam’s Razor: theism’s explanatory resources are so unconstrained that it dilutes its predictive power. So what I am really saying, in Bayesian terms:

Suppose:

• \( D \) is the data: “This universe has life-permitting constants: \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_N \)”
• \( T \): theism
• \( N \): naturalism

Then the Fine-Tuning Argument hinges on:

\[ P(D \mid T) > P(D \mid N) \]

But I am arguing:

• Under naturalism, \( P(D \mid N) \) is small, yes — but computed over a fixed parameter space.
• Under theism, \( P(D \mid T) \) is even smaller, because the denominator of all God-could-have-created possibilities is enormous.

So:

\[ P(D \mid T) \ll P(D \mid N) \]

Thus, the evidence of fine-tuning favors naturalism more than theism, if we accept the logic of the argument but apply it symmetrically. I am not the first obviously to make such a criticism. Paul Draper has argued that Theism is a "very flexible hypothesis" that lacks predictive specificity. I think that's a very charitable description; on my view theism is not well-defined and completely ad-hoc. Jeffrey Lowder and Nichalas Everitt have argued that, given divine freedom, any outcome is compatible with theism, which reduces its explanatory power. In other words, you can always say "God had reason to do it, it's not impossible"; more on that later. Michael Tooley has a similar line of reasoning to show that theism cannot assign meaningful priors to cosmological outcomes. If theism cannot assign meaningful prior probabilities to the constants we observe,  because God could have created anything, then theism predicts nothing in particular, and thus cannot make any observed feature of the universe more likely; more freedom equals less explanatory power. If God could have created any set of physical laws, why does the universe so closely resemble a brute, mechanistic, mathematically elegant, indifferent system,  the kind we’d expect if no one cared how it turned out? That is: theism, by its nature, expects purpose, personal involvement, and moral significance. But the actual universe looks like what naturalism would predict: elegant laws, no moral direction baked into physics, a vast cosmos mostly hostile to life.

Third Objection

My third contention is on the topic of divine psychology. Simply put, there is no reason to suspect why god would prefer a life permitting universe over the alternative, without assuming something theological, which defeats the entire purpose of the argument as a proof for gods existence in the first place. This argument is supposed to demonstrate the existence of a god, so if the theist has to add an ad-hoc hypothesis to the nature of god, then it seems like this undermines the purpose of the argument. For example, many theists say "god is perfect", but given that understanding of god, it makes no sense why god would create anything, since creating something implies an absence of something (or a need), which would contradict perfection. But yeah anyway more broadly, the divine preference objection.

The fine-tuning argument assumes that God would prefer to create a life-permitting universe, or is more likely to do so than not, but this assumption has no independent justification. Theism alone (i.e., bare theism) says only: “A god exists.” It tells us nothing about what kind of universe that god would create, unless we import specific theological claims (e.g., "God is good", "God values life", "God desires conscious agents"). But such claims are not derivable from generic theism, and so smuggling them in defeats the purpose of using fine-tuning as an argument for God’s existence in the first place. It’s like trying to prove aliens exist by pointing to crop circles, but having to assume in advance that aliens like to make crop circles.

Why not a universe filled with beauty but no life? Or pure mathematical elegance? Or nothing at all? If God is omnipotent and omniscient, he has infinite options. Without access to his psychology, we have no idea which worlds he would favor. Therefore, we cannot assign a higher probability to this world (with life-permitting constants) being created.

Creation implies a desire to actualize something, a lack or absence in the current state, and a change in the state (from uncreated to created). But a timeless, changeless, perfect being shouldn't change at all, let alone act. So when theists claim “God wants to create life,” they're appealing to a psychological model that is theologically contested, philosophically murky, and logically questionable.

So the main premise "P(Life-permitting universe∣Theism) is high.", actually requires a model of divine psychology, justification for gods preferences, and a reason why this universe is more likely than others. Yet, theism gives us no predictive leverage without imported theology. The hypothesis becomes circular; you assume what you are trying to prove. In order for theism to explain fine-tuning better than naturalism, it must predict fine-tuning. But theism can’t predict anything without assuming something ad hoc about God's goals. Therefore, theism fails to be the better explanation, because it offers no expectations without theological scaffolding.

Fourth Objection

Another contention is that proponents of this argument seem to just crucially misunderstand mathematical modeling and it's relation to broader theorizing.

I am trained as an applied econometrician and have extensive experience in optimization and operations research modeling at work. From my understanding of "parameters", these are the things we estimate to fit a model to data. The parameters determine the observed values, so our job is to model this data generating process by identifying the most likely parameter values that generated the data. Since there are different parameter values, we have loss functions that help us figure out what that parameter is, and we normally seek to minimize or maximize some objective function such that it minimizes or maximizes some loss. But the parameters are estimated, like in linear regression, we specify the functional form based on some underlying theory, estimate the parameters of a model (our alpha and beta), then we assess the models performance, do V&V, and compare it to other models. This is in essence what physicists do as well when it comes to these fundamental physics models.

Obviously many of these models are tied to a broader theory. For example, in economics, the specification of econometric models are inherently connected with the underlying economic theory we are trying to model. The model is not just a data-fitting tool; it's an expression of a theory about how the world works. The model structure is not free-form: it’s dictated by theory, often constrained by mathematical consistency and experimental invariance. You wouldn’t just throw variables into a regression without theoretical justification (at least in principled work). The functional form (linear, log-linear, dynamic panel, etc.) is chosen based on economic theory (e.g., utility maximization, rational expectations). The form of the model is not arbitrary; it expresses causal, mechanistic, or structural beliefs about the system. Estimation calibrates the model to reality, but theoretical coherence precedes estimation. A good model must Explain observed phenomena, Predict future (or unobserved) outcomes, Remain robust under perturbation (new data, different conditions), Possibly generalize or unify multiple datasets/theories.

So fundamental constants are artifacts (or by-products) of our theoretical modeling frameworks. They arise because, we formulate mathematical models to describe observed phenomena, these models have free parameters (the constants) that need to be specified to make predictions. The constants only “exist” within the context of the model; they are not directly observable, only inferred through how the model fits the data. So just like in econometrics or statistics, Constants like 𝐺, ℏ, or 𝛼 are only meaningful within the theory that posits them. A different theoretical framework might: use different constants, combine them into dimensionless groups, or explain them as emergent from more fundamental principles. While constants are artifacts of the model, the values we estimate for them reflect real, stable features of the universe; as far as we can tell. The best model we have needs these specific knobs set to these precise values to match reality. The constants are not observed objects in nature. But their values constrain what kind of models can be true, because only certain values give rise to the observed structure of the universe. Constants are model-dependent parameters; they are by-products of how we formalize physical law, and their necessity and meaning depend on the structure of our theories.

So when people are amazed by the alleged "fine tuning" of the universe, i think they are just completely misunderstanding whats going on. "If we adjust the parameters ever so slightly, things would be a lot different", well no shit because the model is fitted to this data and determined by this theory, it wouldnt make sense for them to not take those values. The constants are not arbitrary knobs that nature randomly spun. They're part of a model that was designed to describe this universe, calibrated to match the observed data from this universe and not necessarily meaningful in counterfactual universes.

So saying “What if the constants had different values?” Is like saying: “What if we refit the model to describe data that doesn’t exist?” ... of course everything changes; because the entire structure of the model and data relationship has changed. In cases where phycisists are puzzled by the fine tuning, fine-tuning is not just rhetorical; it’s a sign that our model may be incomplete, not that the universe is spooky. These constants take the values they do because the model was designed to fit this universe. Of course if you change them, you get a different universe, that’s just tautological. Small changes in parameter values causing large physical effects isn’t evidence of design or surprise, it’s a natural consequence of building a predictive model from data. In statistical language: it's like being shocked that your regression coefficients don't generalize when you simulate new data from a totally different DGP. When people say "the universe is fine tuned!", they're exploring the behavior of a model off its data manifold. That’s not surprising; it just means the model isn’t robust to arbitrary extrapolation. The parameter values inferred from this model are sensitive to change within that same model. But that sensitivity is a reflection of the model structure, not necessarily a fundamental fact about ‘possible universes’.

Lets formulate the core claim: The Fine-Tuning Argument misinterprets what physical constants are and how they arise in modeling. It mistakes features of our theoretical frameworks for features of reality itself, leading to confused metaphysical conclusions about "design" or "fine-tuning."

1. Constants Are Theoretical Artifacts: Constants like 𝐺, ℏ , 𝛼 are not free-floating dials in nature. They are parameters in mathematical models that best fit observed data within a given theoretical structure. Their values are inferred through fitting, not directly observed,  much like regression coefficients. “What if the constants were different?” is like saying: “What if the estimated regression coefficients were different for a different dataset?” The answer is: of course they’d be different , because you're changing the data-generating process.
2. Models Are Tied to Theory: Just as in economics or statistics, the form of the model is theory-driven, not arbitrarily chosen. It encodes structural and causal assumptions about how the system works. Constants emerge from this structure as by-products ,  not as metaphysical primitives. Constants only make sense in the context of the model. Change the theory → change the model → change the constants.
3. Sensitivity Is Not Design , It's Expected: The fact that small changes in constants cause large changes in outcomes is a normal feature of any tightly fitted, nonlinear model. It’s not evidence of design,  it's a signal of model specificity. If a model behaves wildly when extrapolated off its data manifold, that’s not a metaphysical insight,  it's a common modeling limitation. Being shocked by fine-tuning is like being shocked that your OLS coefficients don’t work when the covariates come from a completely different distribution.
4. Counterfactual Confusion: Asking “What if constants were different?” assumes the model would still apply to a counterfactual universe. But that’s false: the model was designed to describe this universe. If the constants were different, so would the laws, the equations, the symmetries. This is like asking what would happen to your regression coefficients if your data came from a completely different distribution; a meaningless question without a new model.

The fine tuning argument rests on an intuition that "It's astonishing that out of all the possible parameter settings, this specific set gives rise to life". But the constants are not drawn from a probability distribution, they are not arbitrary knobs to be "tuned", they are outputs of a model designed to capture the observed data. Sensitivity does not mean design, its just expected behavior in well-fit models. Hence, the entire metaphysical interpretation of fine-tuning collapses because the "improbability" or "delicacy" of the constants reflects the structure of our models, not the structure of reality itself. It tells us that our models are precisely fitted, not that the universe is deliberately constructed. The fine tuning argument is literally just a category error: Treating model parameters as ontologically fundamental realities, and then using their “tuned” values to infer divine purpose. It’s akin to mistaking the slope of a regression line for a cosmic law. The values are meaningful within the model, but do not warrant metaphysical conclusions about their necessity, randomness, or design.

The Fine Tuning argument is literally just a category error. The proponents assume physical parameters are "given" and freely adjustable. But in reality, physical laws emerge from mathematical consistency. The fact the small changes to parameters "break" the model does not mean the parameters were "set", it simply means these are the values that make the system work for our observations. The parameters are a result of an optimization process. 

Let's unpack further the ridiculousness of this reasoning. Suppose you estimate an econometric model of consumer behavior and determine its parameters based on real-world data. If you arbitrarily change the parameters (without reestimating them or refitting the model), the predictions will no longer match observed consumer behavior. Would you conclude that consumer preferences were "fine-tuned" for the economy? Would you say that the economy was divinely adjusted to make people eat specific products? Of course not. You would simply recognize that models are sensitive to their parameters—because they were fitted to describe specific conditions. This is precisely what happens in physics. We have physical models that describe the universe under known constants. If we arbitrarily change those constants, the model no longer describes reality. This does not mean the constants were "set" by an external agent. Consumer preferences were not "set" by this external agent either. To conclude this is absurd. It is not evidence of "fine tuning", this is a basic property of models. 

This "Fine-Tuning" "parameter sensitivity" fallacy can be applied to any discipline. If we accept the Fine-Tuning Argument’s reasoning, we could absurdly claim that anything that depends on parameters is "fine-tuned."

1. Climate Models
   • Climate models use parameters like CO₂ concentration, solar radiation, ocean currents to predict global temperature changes.
   • If we arbitrarily change those values, the model no longer reflects observed climate patterns.
   • Should we conclude that climate was "fine-tuned" for human civilization?
   • No! The model is just sensitive to its input parameters, but that does not mean those values were externally "set."
2. Engineering & Aerodynamics
   • Aircraft designers use fluid dynamics models to design airplanes.
   • If we arbitrarily change the drag coefficient, air density, or engine power, the plane might not fly.
   • Would we conclude that drag coefficients were "fine-tuned" by a divine entity to allow for aviation?
   • No! Those values were determined by physics and engineering constraints.
3. Economics & Markets
   • Suppose we model GDP growth based on interest rates, investment levels, and labor supply.
   • If we arbitrarily change interest rates in the model, predicted GDP may crash.
   • Should we conclude that interest rates were "fine-tuned" to sustain economic prosperity?
   • Of course not! The relationships between variables emerge from the system itself.

This might be the most frustrating thing about the argument. Many people classify it as an "argument from science" or an "Argument that is consistent with science", but it fundamentally misunderstands what "the science" is telling us yet proceeds to use it as evidence in support of a dubious premise in a dubious philosophical argument.

Given this point, it should be obvious that theism actually fails to explain anything about the universe. Theism does not explain why the universe has this specific structure, as opposed to some other structural features, in any rigorous, predictive, non-ad-hoc way. "Fine tuning" argument is not an argument based on science, its a misunderstanding of mathematical modeling. I would expect a theistic view to be able to differentiate between different structures of the universe, why god chose one over another. I know this isnt relevant to the argument, but it seems like a massive limitation of any theistic explanation since it lacks most theoretical virtues. There is a fundamental asymmetry between scientific explanation and theistic explanation, and this entire argument demonstrates why theism fails as a serious explanatory framework of anything. A good scientific explanation is judged by properties like:

• Explanatory Scope – how much it accounts for
• Explanatory Power – how strongly it entails or predicts the data
• Predictive Accuracy – how well it forecasts new data
• Coherence – internal logical consistency
• Simplicity/Parsimony – not positing more entities than needed
• Falsifiability/Discriminative Power – how it rules out alternatives

These virtues are exemplified when a theory is empirically anchored, mathematically rigorous, and subject to external validation and comparison. Theism literally lacks all of these virtues. It does not predict the structure, it does not constrain what kind of universe God would create, it does not offer counterfactual clarity, it provides no contrastive reasoning, and it requires a theological patchwork to account for every feature. This makes theistic explanation entirely post hoc (invented to match the observed world after the fact), ad-hoc (customized by adding speculative properties to god to fit observed outcomes), and non discriminative (theism simply explains everything). If a theory explains everything, it explains nothing particular. Theism has no predictive machinery. It cannot generate testable expectations, quantify the likelihood of outcomes, or prioritize explanations. It lacks all the core features of any legitimate theoretical framework. It is a rhetorical afterthought. Bas van Fraassen tells us that Scientific theories aim to be empirically adequate, not metaphysically exhaustive. Theism flips that around: it tries to be metaphysically complete, but empirically empty. It gives answers that don’t generate data, predict anomalies, or guide research.

Fifth Objection

My last contention with the Fine tuning argument is internal semantic contradictions. God is supposed to be defined as the unbounded tri-omni god. But the very concept of "fine tuning" implies constraints on gods abilities. Going back to the initial argument, "fine tuned for life", it seems like we are putting constraints on what god is capable of doing. Why would god need to fine tune anything? Couldn't he create any parameter combination suitable for life? When I fine tune something, I am fine tuning it specifically because there are constraints or considerations outside of my control, such that I must fine tune these things in order for the thing to function. For example, suppose I am a machinist, who needs to fine tune the parameters of my machine for a specific environment. Well, that means the environment is given, external to my control, and I cannot fundamentally change the machine at the moment so I need to adjust its parameters in order for it to function. I am operating in an environment outside of my control, under constraints. God would not be constrained, hence no need to fine tune anything for life. The argument literally doesn't even get going unless we assume a limited god who had preexisting "stuff" to work with, but many people use this argument for classical theism. The very notion of “fine-tuning” presupposes constraints. But a classical theistic God—omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent—is by definition unbounded. So the concept of “fine-tuning” is incoherent when applied to such a being.

In all ordinary usage (engineering, modeling, software, etc.), fine-tuning means the parameters must be precisely adjusted to achieve a goal, the system must be tuned within external constraints — like physical laws, fixed materials, or an unchangeable environment, and if you don’t tune correctly, the system fails to meet its purpose. Fine-tuning = constrained optimization. But classical theism asserts God is omnipotent (no limitations on what it can do), omnisufficient (nothing external to god constraints or influences its decisions), and creates ex-nihilo (no preexisting stuff). Given these attributes, why would god need to "fine tune" anything at all? If God has no constraints, then “fine-tuning” is meaningless, it is semantically vacuous and hence the entire argument is a waste of time. There are only two options:

1. God is constrained — He must work with pre-given physics, or can only generate life in a narrow set of physical conditions → Then God is not omnipotent. That contradicts classical theism.
2. God is not constrained — He can instantiate any laws, any parameters, even life without physics → Then there is no need for fine-tuning. The observation of "finely tuned parameters" becomes irrelevant to God’s creative act.

Either way, the fine-tuning argument falls apart. It only has bite if God operates like an engineer or modeler within limitations. But then that isn’t God anymore—it’s a cosmic machinist. Suppose I’m trying to design a machine for an extreme environment, and I have limited materials. I must fine-tune dimensions, materials, tolerances, etc. Why? Because the environment is fixed, my tools and materials are limited, and failure modes are real and unforgiving. But God, supposedly, has infinite resources, creates the environment itself, and controls all failure modes. So if He needs to "fine-tune," then something is wrong with the concept of omnipotence.

If you press the semantics of “fine-tuning,” the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) becomes conceptually incoherent when wedded to classical theism. It requires either a non-classical god with limitations or a view where "fine-tuning" is meaningless since god can actualize life under any conditions. The argument literally breaks down. Use the FTA, and quietly smuggle in constraints on god (violating omnipotence), and hence shifting the definition of god. Preserve classical theism, and lose the force of the inference all together.

• Fine-tuning implies constraints on action, optimization under limits.
• Classical theism asserts no such constraints.
• Therefore, fine-tuning makes no sense as a phenomenon relevant to God.
• If you need to fine-tune, you’re not a God—you’re a glorified engineer.
• Thus, the FTA undermines the very concept of God it's meant to support.

Positing a limited god also seems problematic. If we are to say that God is not all powerful, then what is a reasonable threshold on his power? It seems we must arbitrarily stipulate conditions, which are ad hoc adjustments on the explanatory hypothesis that are unjustified.  If God is not omnipotent, then what exactly is His level of power? There is no non-arbitrary way to define a threshold for how powerful God must be in order to fine-tune the universe but not create life directly. Any such threshold would be ad hoc; chosen only to make the argument work, rather than being justified by independent reasoning. If we assume a non-omnipotent god, we must define this god’s limitations in a way that explains fine tuning but does not make additional ad-hoc assumptions. But there is no principled way to do this. Any proposal that god must fine-tune but cannot create life without fine-tuning requires a very specific, ultimately unjustified definition of divine power. This makes the argument a textbook case of ad-hoc reasoning; it modifies the explanatory hypothesis to fit the evidence rather than making testable, independent predictions. 

In Bayesian terms, the prior probability of a limited god is extremely low, because classical theism has traditionally assumed an all-powerful god. A "partially powerful" god is an entirely new hypothesis, and we have no independent evidence for such a being. The prior probability of an arbitrarily constrained god is therefore much lower. Adding more ad-hoc adjustments to a hypothesis necessarily reduces the probability of it being true. Furthermore, if we allow some limitations on Gods power, what stops us from allowing more? This creates an infinite spectrum of possible gods, and choosing just one as the "fine-tuning designer" is completely arbitrary. This is a textbook case of the God of the Gaps; we insert a tailor-made deity exactly where we do not yet have a physical explanation.

1. If God is omnipotent, fine-tuning is unnecessary. An omnipotent God does not need to fine-tune constants to create life. This makes fine-tuning incompatible with classical theism.
2. If God is limited, we must arbitrarily define those limits. What is the threshold for God’s power? Any answer will be ad hoc and arbitrary, making the argument scientifically useless.
3. A limited-god hypothesis has no independent justification. We have no reason to assume such a god exists beyond this argument. This makes the Fine-Tuning Argument circular, it assumes a constrained god only to justify fine-tuning.
4. Fine-tuning resembles a "workaround" rather than a rational design. If fine-tuning is necessary, it suggests God is working within constraints He did not create. This contradicts classical theism, which holds that God is the source of all reality.
5. The argument commits the God of the Gaps fallacy. It fills a gap in knowledge with a tailor-made deity. If physics ever explains why constants take their values, the argument will collapse.

Sixth Objection

Another fatal flaw in the Fine-Tuning Argument is that if the universe were truly fine-tuned for life, we would expect life to be abundant, widespread, and easy to sustain. Instead, empirical reality suggests that life is rare, fragile, and constantly struggling against a mostly inhospitable cosmos. This contradicts the very claim that the universe was designed specifically for life.

If the universe were fine-tuned for life, we would expect life to be widespread and effortlessly sustained. But what do we actually observe? Over 99.99999999% of the universe is completely lethal to life. The vast majority of space is a vacuum that will kill any biological organism instantly. The few solid objects (planets, moons, asteroids) are mostly frozen, toxic, or extremely hot. Supernovae, gamma-ray bursts, and cosmic radiation regularly sterilize entire regions of space. There is also extreme energy waste. If the universe were fine-tuned for life, why does 99.99% of its energy output come from stars that do not contribute to life? The vast majority of stars are completely useless for sustaining any kind of biology. A "fine-tuned" system should minimize existential threats, yet the universe seems to maximize them. 

Even Earth is barely hospitable. If the universe was finely tuned for life, why does most of Earth's surface remain hostile? 71% of the planet is covered in water, where humans cannot survive without technology. Large portions of the landmass are deserts, mountains, and frozen tundras unsuitable for human habitation. Frequent natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions) make survival precarious. Oxygen levels were unbreathable for billions of years, and mass extinctions regularly threaten most life. If Earth is the best that a fine-tuned universe can do, then fine-tuning seems like a very inefficient way to achieve life.

Life appears to be an afterthought, not a central goal. If the purpose of the universe was to create life, why did it take 13.8 billion years for intelligent beings to emerge? For most of cosmic history, there was no life. Even on Earth, life was single-celled for 90% of its history. The laws of physics allow a vast, dead cosmos with tiny specks of life struggling to survive, which seems like a horribly inefficient way to design a life-supporting universe. If we assume intentional fine-tuning for life, this data is completely unexpected. But under naturalism, it makes perfect sense. Life is an accidental byproduct of physical processes. Most of the universe is not "designed" for life, and life only appears where conditions randomly allow it.

The fine tuning argument is yet another example of understating the evidence. If fine-tuning was real, life should be everywhere, not extremely rare. If fine-tuning was real, life should be robust, not constantly on the edge of extinction. If fine-tuning was real, the laws of physics should be optimized for life, not overwhelmingly indifferent to it. Instead, what we observe is a vast, mostly empty cosmos where life barely clings to existence; which is exactly what we expect under naturalism. Thus, the Fine-Tuning Argument does not just fail; it actually provides evidence against design. Unless of course, we make ad-hoc adjustments to our theistic hypothesis. 

Conclusion

Earlier when I said "I don't know how theists find this argument compelling", I was being somewhat facetious. The plausibility of an argument is very much a function of your plausibility structure. But this argument is very pathetic. I think it exemplifies why I have my particular view on questions about speculative metaphysics.