The Nature of Agnosticism Part 5

I was rereading old posts and realized I vaguely touched on miracles and religious experience. Suddenly, it dawned on me that I've neglected these concepts. I've underemphasized their importance in relation to other concepts that I've belabored in the past and I never attempted to properly define the terms. I lump these together because there appears to be a deep interrelatedness between the two. "Miracle" tends to be the interpretation of a religious experience. Likewise, religious experiences seem to always involve some alleged miracle. They are deeply interrelated concepts that are actually fundamental to persistence of belief, but also point to interesting psychological traits of religious people that seem to predispose individuals to interpret arbitrary events as miraculous, and sociological factors that enable the conditions of acceptance. When you step outside the realm of ridiculous apologetics and theology, many evangelists will testify to some religious experience in hopes of persuading you. Many down to earth conversations with believers will almost always involve some description of their religious experiences. This seems to be the most compelling force driving belief for many believers. This also implies the existence of mechanisms that predispose religious believers to look for miracles, interpret arbitrary events as miracles, and block competing interpretations of the sensory experience. This is also highly interconnected with the notion of "divine revelation" and in many instances (particularly with Abrahamic religions) prophetic experiences. All of this will be covered here. We will also cover the dialectical structure that transmits alleged religious experiences. There seems to be a narrative structure or script that is common to religious experiences independent of the, often conflicting, contents described when engaging with an interlocutor. In other words, there appears to be a role-play that religious people act out when describing their experiences to others; it's a kind of decentralized ritualism that emerges independent of any officially recognized rituals (like the eucharist for example), like a pattern of behavior unique to forms of theism. I've touched on this briefly in the past but now I think its important to investigate.

Before diving into this post, I think its crucial to make quite a few distinctions that are consistently conflated when discussing this topic. I think these are some of the most compelling reasons people become Theists, but they are also the most epistemically problematic. Let X = " some object/event/occurrence/experience/text etc.", the necessary distinctions are:

1. X vs the cause of X: X is the sensation of experience, while the cause of X is what enabled it
2. X vs your interpretation of X: X Is the raw data, while your interpretation is the meaning you assign to it within a broader cultural context
3. X vs your perception of X: X is the thing itself, while your perception of X is distinct and involves selecting, organizing, and what sensory information is relevant to understanding the world around us.
4. X vs your description X: X is the thing, while your description of the thing are the labels you assign to that thing, which can diverge from person to person. These will also include categorizations. The classification of X is how it is categorized based on external systems of organization, which may not capture the full essence of X. A dolphin (X) is biologically classified as a mammal (classification of X), but classification is a human-imposed system.
5. X vs the effects of X: X is the occurrence or object itself, while its effects are what result from it. The effects may be immediate or long-term, but they are distinct from X itself.
6. X vs the context of X: X occurs within a specific context, which includes its environment, historical background, and situational factors. While context influences X, it is not X itself.
7. X vs the significance of X: The significance of X is the value or meaning attributed to it by individuals or society. X might be neutral on its own, but it is given importance through interpretation.
8. X vs your memory of X: X is the original event, while your memory of it is a reconstruction influenced by bias, fading details, and reinterpretation over time. A childhood vacation may be remembered differently than how it actually happened.
9. X vs your emotional reaction to X: X is what happens, while your emotional reaction is how you personally feel about it. Emotional responses can vary widely between individuals.
10. X vs your expectations of X: Your expectations of X are predictions, assumptions, or hopes about what X should be, which may or may not align with reality.
11. X vs the representation of X: A representation (e.g., a painting, photograph, or model) is an attempt to depict X, but it is not X itself. A map of a city (representation of X) is not the actual city (X). This is similar to the fallacy of reification or map vs territory fallacy.  
12. X vs the knowledge of X: X is the thing or event itself, while knowledge of X is the information someone has about it. One can have partial, inaccurate, or no knowledge of X, but X still exists independently.
13. X vs alternative versions of X: X is the actual thing, while alternative versions are possible modifications or variations of it. For example, there may be different versions of a story or book tailored to a specific audience. 
14. X vs the structure of X: The structure of X refers to its composition, organization, or design, but X as a whole may include more than just its structure. A house (X) is not just its blueprint (structure of X); it also includes its function, occupants, and history.
15. X vs the purpose of X: The purpose of X is the intention or function behind it (if any), but X can exist without a purpose. A tree (X) exists regardless of whether humans assign it a purpose (e.g., providing shade or oxygen).
16. X vs the medium through which X is conveyed: The way X is transmitted (e.g., through a book, film, or spoken word) is different from X itself.
17. X vs the history of X: X exists at a moment in time, while its history includes all events that led up to it. A law (X) is different from the political and social events that caused it to be enacted (history of X).
18. X vs the rules governing X: Some events or activities operate within systems of rules, but the rules themselves are separate from X. A soccer game (X) is different from the rulebook that governs it (rules of X).
19. X vs X as part of a larger system: X may be one part of a greater whole but is not identical to the entire system.
20. X vs its cultural meaning: A thing may have different meanings in different cultures, but those meanings are separate from X itself. A handshake (X) means different things in different societies, but the gesture itself remains the same.

Throughout the post, I'll make reference to these, because I essentially want to argue that religious experiences, miracles, and revelation are byproducts of the inability to make one or many of these distinctions. They are the result of unclear and wishful thinking. I'll incorporate the idea of a plausibility structure to explain the believability of these sorts of claims. A plausibility structure is the social matrix within which a belief system becomes credible. Religious experience is only believable because it happens within a community that legitimates it through shared assumptions, practices, and language. Once internalized, these structures make alternative views seem unintelligible or threatening, reinforcing belief. These claims are more believable given certain background assumptions, while the structure also amplifies known cognitive biases that prime people into finding these things more acceptable than what they warrant. These act as social conditions of belief, where miracles are only persuasive within certain interpretive frameworks, essentially amplifying biases while filtering disconfirming evidence.  The believability of these claims normally rests on one or many of errors in reasoning or cognitive biases. This list might not be exhaustive but common errors include:

• Anecdotal Evidence
• Narrative Fallacy
• Echo Chambers
• Availability Herustic
• Social Proof Heuristic
• Motivated Reasoning
• Confirmation Bias
• Self Serving Bias
• Post Hoc Fallacy
• Patternicity
• Agenticity
• Representative Heuristic
• Illusory Correlation
• The Problem of Underdetermination
• Bayesian Reasoning Failure
• Self Identity Preservation
• Issues with Testimonial Epistemology

There are also many critical sociological and performative dimensions that bolster the plausibility and perceived authenticity of religious experiences. For example, it’s a social taboo to question someone’s alleged religious experience unless of course it comes from a different religion or diverging denomination. In many religious contexts, personal religious experience is treated as sacred, private, and off-limits to critique, especially when it aligns with the group’s shared beliefs. Questioning someone’s testimony is often seen as rude, irreverent, or even spiritually dangerous, which socially inoculates the testimony from scrutiny. In other words, no one is taught to be critical of these testimonies. This deference is not applied equally: experiences from rival denominations or religions are often met with skepticism or reinterpretation (e.g., “they were deceived,” “that’s demonic,” etc.).  This selective skepticism reinforces the in-group plausibility structure while protecting it from external challenges. I’ve also noticed patterns in the way these experiences are communicated at churches; alter calls, seemingly scripted “experiences” (their stories always seem to follow a similar pattern), and feedback from the community. When someone communicates an experience using an accepted cultural script, it seems more plausible. Testimonies of religious experience often follow familiar narrative arcs: sin/crisis → encounter with the divine → transformation → reintegration into the community. These patterns become cultural templates, shaping how people interpret and express their experiences. Think of it as a kind of “narrative scaffolding”: experiences are squeezed into formats the community recognizes and affirms. This sort of performativity occurs within church settings, where pressure to conform is likely the highest. Events like altar calls, healing services, or revivals are emotionally charged and socially performative environments. In these spaces, people are often coached implicitly or explicitly on how to behave and what kinds of experiences to expect (and report). Public feedback (affirmation, applause, tears, prayer) rewards conformity to these expected patterns, encouraging people to present their experiences in ways that are recognizably “spiritual” or “miraculous.” The more a community celebrates and validates religious experiences, the more people internalize these as real and valuable. There's often a feedback loop: personal experience → community affirmation → greater belief → reinterpretation of further events through that belief. In many communities, not having an experience (or not having the “right” kind) can be stigmatized. People may feel compelled to conform, embellish, or even fabricate experiences to maintain spiritual status or avoid marginalization. From an early age, people in religious environments learn what “counts” as a religious experience, what vocabulary to use, and what the community values. This is not necessarily deceitful, often it's genuine enculturation, where people sincerely interpret ambiguous internal states (e.g., emotional arousal, dissociation, awe) through a religious lens because that’s the interpretive framework they’ve been taught. Religious experiences and miracle testimonies, while persuasive, are epistemologically weak because they emerge in social environments that reward belief, discourage doubt, and amplify biases. These social dynamics are part of the plausibility structure; they not only help make the beliefs feel credible but also mask or deflect critical scrutiny. Miracles and religious experiences are persuasive within plausibility structures because they're embedded in a social world that validates them, not because they withstand objective scrutiny.

The concept of Frame Analysis can help illuminate more broadly what I am describing. Social interaction is like a performance, where individuals play roles and manage impressions based on the expectations of their "audience." Religious settings (e.g., churches, summer camp, retreats) are stage-like environments with scripts, costumes, rituals, and cues that shape how religious experience is expressed and interpreted. Framing helps individuals understand “what is going on here” ,  it organizes how we interpret ambiguous events. Testimonies and miracle stories are performed within expected frames, shaped to match community scripts and receive social validation. The performative and staged nature of church spaces (altar calls, healing services) creates conditions that prime people to interpret experiences as spiritual or miraculous.

Pierre Bourdieu introduced the notion of "Habitus", which refers to the internalized dispositions shaped by social structures; we come to "feel" and "know" the world in ways that match our social context. Religious experience is not just believable, it's felt and embodied because of early and repeated exposures to the religious field. Symbolic capital (spiritual credibility, holiness) accrues to those who can convincingly display signs of religious experience within that field. Religious institutions reproduce belief systems by legitimizing certain experiences as “authentic” and discrediting others. People may genuinely experience what they’re trained to feel, because their habitus predisposes them to interpret events through a religious lens. Miraculous experiences bring symbolic rewards, reinforcing their recurrence even if the epistemic basis is weak.

In When God Talks Back (2012) and Persuasions of the Witch's Craft (1989), Tanya Luhrmann discusses the concept that religious practitioners learn to interpret thoughts, emotions, and events as divine communication through repeated exposure to specific cultural practices. In charismatic evangelical contexts, believers are trained to use imaginative techniques to hear God’s voice, this makes religious experiences feel vivid and real. The line between imagination and perception blurs through practice, making people more susceptible to “experiencing” the divine. The idea being that miraculous and spiritual experiences are not spontaneous, but the result of deliberate training in interpretive practices that teach believers to see the world in supernatural terms. Plausibility is socially and cognitively constructed, not objectively evident.

The persuasiveness of religious experience and miracle claims can be understood not only through cognitive biases, but through sociological frameworks that reveal how such experiences are scaffolded by culture and community. As Berger (1967) argues, plausibility structures render belief credible by embedding it in a shared social world. Goffman’s (1956) dramaturgical model highlights the performative nature of testimony, where experiences conform to community scripts. Bourdieu (1977) shows how habitus shapes perception and symbolic capital incentivizes displays of spiritual authority. Finally, Luhrmann (2012) demonstrates that spiritual experiences are cultivated through disciplined imaginative practice, not spontaneous eruptions of the divine.

Summary of agnosticism and Religious Skepticism

1. The Hidden Problem with Religious Arguments
2. Begging the Question

Miracle Arguments

1. Cameron asked about miracle claims. I answered.
2. Arif Ahmed, On Miracles
3. Hume Miracles
4. An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism

Religious Experience

1. Episode 13, Religious Experience (Part I)
2. Episode 13, Religious Experience (Part II)
3. Episode 13, Religious Experience (Part III)
4. 10 Experiential Arguments for God: An Analysis
5. Philosophical Failures of Christian Apologetics, Part 11: The Holy Spirit
6. Christians And Muslims Don’t Want To Think About This
7. What would convince you of God's existence?
8. Bad Apologetics Ep 10 - Are Near Death Experiences Evidence of Life After Death?
9. Dogmatic Materialists DESTROYED by AMAZING EVIDENCE of Pam Reynolds Near Death Experience Case
10. More Near-Death Delusions and Christian Nonsense
11. The Church is One Big Cosplay—And No One Wants to Admit It