Even More Bad Arguments

 In this post, we will target a very politically charged argument and reveal its absurdity. The "Freedom of Conscience" argument frequently arises in the context of some high profile legal dispute. It resurfaces often when politicians need an example to push a political narrative in order to bolster support among their base. They will leverage the example, highlighting the argument, subsequently motivating their supporters to vote in favor of their political movement. It's important to recognize the practical use of this argument; it's one of many someone can use to advance support for a cause. First, we will steelman the argument, analyze its structure, reveal hidden assumptions, and identify points of weakness. Then we will deconstruct it, showing why it fails. Finally, we will identify it's pragmatic use, which reveals why it's persuasive or compelling to some, despite being utter nonsense. 

We will represent the Freedom of Conscience Argument in a formal argumentation scheme in premise-conclusion format, clarifying its warrants (the inferential links between premises and conclusion), and hidden assumptions that support the plausibility of each premise.

• P1: Individuals possess moral autonomy, which entails the right to live in accordance with their deeply held moral or religious convictions.
• P2: Forcing individuals to act against their deeply held beliefs causes significant psychological, moral, or spiritual harm and violates their dignity.
• P3: A pluralistic and free society must tolerate a diversity of beliefs and allow reasonable accommodation of those beliefs to protect individual liberty.
• P4: Laws that compel individuals to violate their conscience infringe on this liberty and moral autonomy.
• P5: Therefore, the state ought to accommodate individuals who refuse legal duties or obligations when doing so would require them to violate their conscience—provided the accommodation does not impose undue harm on others or the public interest.
• C: Individuals should be legally and morally permitted to act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with their deeply held moral or religious beliefs, even if doing so conflicts with otherwise applicable laws or duties.

In argumentation, a warrant is the underlying assumption, belief, or principle that connects the evidence to the claim, explaining why the evidence supports the claim. It's the "bridge" that shows the logical link between the data and the conclusion. Warrants are often implicit, meaning they are not explicitly stated but are assumed by the speaker and understood by the audience. All arguments rely on warrants to varying degrees, depending on the nature of the argument. The argument for "Freedom of Conscience" relies on the following:

• W1 (from P1 to C): Respect for autonomy implies protecting actions grounded in conscience.
• W2 (from P2 to C): If state action causes moral or psychological harm, it should be avoided unless justified by overriding concerns.
• W3 (from P3 to P5): A liberal society must balance law with tolerance, prioritizing conscience unless serious harm results.
• W4 (from P4 to P5): Legal obligations that conflict with conscience must be narrowly justified and subject to exemption frameworks.
• W5 (from P5 to C): The burden of justification is on the state to prove why conscience-based exemptions cannot be allowed.

The argument also relies on crucial hidden assumptions necessary to make the premises plausible. Some of which are identified below:

• HA1: Deeply held beliefs are sincere and identifiable.
• HA2: All sincere beliefs merit the same degree of legal respect, regardless of content or origin (religious or secular).
• HA3: The psychological or spiritual harm caused by violating conscience outweighs the state's interest in uniform legal compliance (in many or most cases).
• HA4: There are reliable mechanisms to evaluate the sincerity and legitimacy of conscience claims.
• HA5: Accommodating individual conscience will not lead to systemic abuse, legal incoherence, or social harm.

Based on Douglas Walton’s framework for argumentation schemes, these critical questions aim to test the plausibility of premises, validity of warrants, and soundness of assumptions. If unanswered, they may undercut or defeat the FCA. They shed light into the weakness of the argument. My main contention is that the argument rests on fragile premises and ambiguous assumptions that become problematic in real-world application. Many of these critical questions simply cannot be answered sufficiently to justify accepting the conclusion:

1. Questions Targeting Premise Plausibility
   • CQ1.1: Is the belief truly "deeply held"? How is depth and sincerity determined?
   • CQ1.2: Is the belief moral or religious in nature, or is it based on political or social preference?
   • CQ1.3: Has the individual ever violated this belief before, or does the belief evolve with convenience?
   • CQ1.4: Does the belief conflict with established empirical evidence (e.g. medical science), and should that matter?
2. Questions Targeting the Warrants
   • CQ2.1: Does moral autonomy entail the right to violate legal duties? Or does autonomy exist within lawful constraints?
   • CQ2.2: Is the psychological harm caused by conscience violation truly more serious than the harm caused by breaking the law (e.g. denying rights to others)?
   • CQ2.3: Can legal systems fairly balance individual conscience with the public interest without bias?
   • CQ2.4: If exemptions are granted, will they remain rare and manageable, or will they be exploited en masse?
   • CQ2.5: Are laws compelling conscience violations truly unavoidable, or are there alternative ways to structure duties to minimize conflict?
3. Questions Targeting Hidden Assumptions
   • CQ3.1: Is it feasible to distinguish between sincerely held beliefs and opportunistic claims?
   • CQ3.2: Do all deeply held beliefs deserve equal accommodation, even if they promote harm, exclusion, or regressive social values?
   • CQ3.3: Does privileging conscience risk creating legal inconsistency and undermining the rule of law?
   • CQ3.4: If two individuals hold mutually exclusive conscience claims (e.g., one wants a service, one refuses to give it), whose conscience takes precedence?
   • CQ3.5: What mechanisms exist to measure “undue harm” to others? Who decides when harm outweighs belief?
4. Scenario-Based Stress Tests
   • CQ4.1: If a pharmacist refuses to dispense birth control due to conscience, and no other pharmacy exists nearby, what happens to the patient’s rights?
   • CQ4.2: If a religious belief mandates child marriage, corporal punishment, or refusal of medical care, should these also be protected?
   • CQ4.3: If every civil servant invoked conscience (e.g., against interracial marriage, trans people, atheists), could the system still function?
   • CQ4.4: If a person develops a conscience-based belief after taking a public office, are they still bound to perform the duties they agreed to?
   • CQ4.5: Could institutions (not just individuals) claim conscience rights—e.g., businesses, hospitals, schools? What happens to public access?
5. Questions About the Origin of Belief

   These questions challenge how the belief was formed and whether that process should affect how much weight or protection it deserves. A belief shaped by lifelong indoctrination or misinformation might not reflect genuine moral autonomy. This undercuts a foundational warrant of the freedom of conscience argument: that the belief authentically reflects the agent’s moral agency.

   • CQ5.1: Was the belief formed through autonomous reflection, or through indoctrination, coercion, or cultural programming?
   • CQ5.2: Does the belief result from manipulation (e.g., cult dynamics, misinformation, dogma)? Should such beliefs be less protected?
   • CQ5.3: Is the belief inherited without question from authority figures or community norms? Should unexamined beliefs be treated differently from critically examined ones?
   • CQ5.4: Is the belief psychologically necessary for the believer (e.g. trauma response, identity preservation), or could it be reasonably revised without serious harm?
   • CQ5.5: Is the origin of the belief relevant to the intent behind invoking it (e.g., genuine conviction vs. pretext for discrimination)?
6. Questions About the Rationality of the Belief

   These questions test whether a belief should be considered valid for legal/moral exemption, based on its internal logic, evidential basis, or real-world consequences. Not all beliefs are created equal. If a belief lacks any basis in reason or reality, or causes unjust harm, there are strong grounds to question why it should be privileged under conscience protections.

   • CQ6.1: Is the belief logically coherent, or does it contain contradictions?
   • CQ6.2: Is the belief falsifiable or responsive to evidence, or is it dogmatically held despite counter-evidence?
   • CQ6.3: Does the belief make empirical claims that are demonstrably false (e.g., "prayer cures bacterial infections")?
   • CQ6.4: Is the belief based on prejudice, stereotype, or pseudo-science (e.g., “LGBTQ+ people undermine society”)?
   • CQ6.5: Should irrational or harmful beliefs be treated differently from beliefs formed through reasoned ethical reflection?
7. Critical Questions About Terminology and Definitions
   • 7A. "Deeply Held Belief"
     • CQ7.1: What exactly qualifies a belief as “deeply held”? Is depth measured by duration, intensity, behavioral commitment, or emotional salience?
     • CQ7.2: Can a belief be “deeply held” but still irrational, harmful, or morally wrong? Should depth alone confer moral or legal legitimacy?
     • CQ7.3: Are we treating all “deeply held” beliefs equally, regardless of whether they are religious, political, philosophical, or pseudoscientific? Should we?
   • 7B. "Diversity of Beliefs"
     • CQ7.4: Does “diversity of beliefs” include beliefs that are discriminatory, violent, or exclusionary? Where are the limits?
     • CQ7.5: Are we confusing descriptive diversity (people hold many different beliefs) with normative diversity (all beliefs deserve equal respect and accommodation)?
     • CQ7.6: Is the call for “diversity” being used selectively to protect dominant or mainstream views (e.g., conservative religious doctrines), rather than truly marginalized beliefs?
   • 7C. "Pluralism"
     • CQ7.7: What kind of pluralism is being invoked; political, moral, religious, epistemic? Are these all treated the same in the argument?
     • CQ7.8: Does a pluralistic society imply unlimited tolerance for all beliefs, or are there boundaries to protect social cohesion and shared norms?
     • CQ7.9: Is “pluralism” being used to avoid hard normative judgments about which beliefs are worth accommodating?
   • 7D. "Conscience"
     • CQ7.10: What distinguishes a belief of “conscience” from a preference, opinion, or bias? Are there identifiable markers?
     • CQ7.11: Does invoking “conscience” automatically confer moral authority, or should it be critically examined like any other moral claim?
     • CQ7.12: Should conscience be treated differently when it causes public consequences versus when it’s a private matter?

The point of critical questioning is to show where an argument is weak or potentially fails. It's the core of critical thinking. All of these questions target different aspects of the argument. It's not a checklist; failing on just one of these could be sufficient to reject the argument. Failing on multiple could be enough to reject it. For example, you can think of the terminology based questions as targeting the semantic warrants of the argument. If the terms collapse under critical pressure, the entire argument becomes unstable, no matter how well structured it looks on the surface. In politically charged persuasive argumentation, ill-defined morally laden language often serves to prevent scrutiny, appeal to emotion, or make weak premises seem noble. By interrogating the language, you're digging into the conceptual foundations of the argument; not just the logic or, but the semantics and framing that define the possible pathways of discourse. The semantic "looseness" of this argument can act as a Trojan Horse, smuggling implicit persuasive definitions into the argument, leading to biased outcomes. For example, consider the "Deeply Held Belief" qualification; what precisely does this mean? One major criticism is that deeply held beliefs, especially when not tied to organized religion, are inherently subjective and difficult to verify. Unlike religious beliefs that might be codified in texts or communal practices, non-religious deeply held beliefs can be personal, unstructured, and private. This subjectivity makes it difficult for courts or governments to assess whether a belief is genuinely "deeply held" or whether it is a convenient justification for avoiding certain legal obligations. This might imply that the only legitimate "deeply held beliefs" are those tied to organized religion, which would imply a legal preference for the religious group over the secular. This can be overlooked if we don't critically examine the concepts framing the argument, but if we identify this issue the argument wont have any force.

On the other hand, some of the questions concerning the epistemic foundation of a belief might not cut as deeply as a core semantic issue. Perhaps someone might agree that establishing a beliefs sincerity is enough to make a legal decision, but disagree whether its origin is entirely relevant to the topic. Someone else might disagree with this; arguing this to be a crucial undercutting defeater. Very often, there is a significant lack of autonomy in belief formation; the resulting beliefs are not the product of indepedent rational thought but rather are instilled in individuals from a young age through manipulative or coercive processes. Many beliefs, particularly those tied to religious or cultural identities, are instilled during their formative years. Some could argue that when beliefs are implanted through indoctrination—where children are exposed to only one worldview and discouraged or prevented from questioning it—these beliefs may not truly represent the individual's autonomous convictions. As such, it is argued that the concept of "freedom of conscience" should not automatically grant protection to actions based on beliefs that were coercively imposed. From a psychological perspective, children’s cognitive development is such that they are particularly vulnerable to the beliefs and values imposed by authority figures (e.g., parents, religious leaders). Because these beliefs are absorbed at a stage when critical thinking is not fully developed, the resulting convictions may be less about personal conscience and more about the passive acceptance of external authority. Remember, a key point of the argument is that we are able to exercise moral autonomy. However, many beliefs are formed through social conditioning and social reinforcement. Beliefs formed through these processes in homogenous communities often lack the scrutiny and testing that more independently formed beliefs might undergo. You could easily argue that this kind of social conditioning, which discourages dissent and critical inquiry, should not be given the same legal protection under freedom of conscience as beliefs formed through more open, rational processes. The process of belief formation is often influenced by power dynamics, where those in positions of authority shape the beliefs of others to serve specific social or ideological purposes. When beliefs are a product of such dynamics, their authenticity and the legitimacy of using them to justify exemptions from laws (e.g., child protection laws) are questioned.

I think the reductio ad absurdum is a powerful tool here. It allows us to accept the freedom of conscience principle at face value and then show that, when consistently applied, it leads to absurd, dangerous, or unworkable consequences. That undercuts the plausibility of the principle itself or reveals that it must be drastically constrained.

1. Reductio 1: The Racist Conscience
   • Scenario: A deeply religious individual believes their faith prohibits them from associating with people of a different race. They work in a public role (e.g., issuing marriage licenses or teaching in public schools) and refuse service or instruction to interracial couples or multiracial children.
   • Implication under FCP: They would be legally entitled to an exemption because their belief is deeply held and religious in nature.
   • Absurd Consequence: This would effectively reintroduce racial segregation under the guise of conscience; something society has definitively rejected as unjust and unconstitutional.
   • Conclusion: If we accept the FCP, we must allow racial discrimination in public services; an unacceptable result.
2. Reductio 2: Anti-Medicine Beliefs in Healthcare
   • Scenario: A Christian Science hospital administrator believes all illness should be treated with prayer. They begin denying conventional treatment in favor of spiritual care, even for emergency trauma patients.
   • Implication under FCP: The hospital may claim conscience-based exemptions from regulations requiring evidence-based care.
   • Absurd Consequence: Patients in critical condition may be subjected to religious practices instead of life-saving care, even in public or licensed institutions.
   • Conclusion: Applying the FCP would jeopardize public health and patient safety; an absurd and dangerous result.
3. Reductio 3: Conscientious Objector Police Officer
   • Scenario: A police officer claims a deeply held belief that women should not be in positions of power. He refuses to respond to calls involving female judges or female commanding officers.
   • Implication under FCP: His deeply held belief would entitle him to an exemption from following orders or providing equal protection under the law.
   • Absurd Consequence: Law enforcement becomes fractured and unreliable, with ideological sub-fiefdoms rather than unified rule of law.
   • Conclusion: FCP erodes the ability of government agencies to function; an unworkable and absurd result.
4. Reductio 4: Child Abuse as Religious Discipline
   • Scenario: A parent believes their religious duty involves harsh corporal punishment; including beatings; to “drive out sin” from their children.
   • Implication under FCP: Their deeply held religious belief justifies an exemption from child abuse laws.
   • Absurd Consequence: Children are legally subjected to physical abuse because the state cannot interfere with “conscience.”
   • Conclusion: FCP protects child abusers under the cloak of religious conviction; morally absurd.
5. Reductio 5: Satanic Conscience in Public Service
   • Scenario: A public official is a sincere follower of a Satanic sect that believes humans must suffer to attain spiritual growth. He uses his discretion in office to slow down benefits, impose punitive rules, and “bless” citizens with suffering.
   • Implication under FCP: His deeply held belief is no less valid than any other, so the state must tolerate his conscientious application of suffering.
   • Absurd Consequence: Citizens are exposed to harmful, arbitrary governance; yet the official is shielded by the same conscience protections granted to others.
   • Conclusion: The FCP requires the state to respect harmful or nihilistic ideologies, if sincerely held; a breakdown of moral accountability.
6. Reductio 6: Anarchist Conscience and Tax Evasion
   • Scenario: A citizen holds an anti-statist belief that taxes are theft. They refuse to pay, citing deeply held ethical beliefs.
   • Implication under FCP: They qualify for a conscience-based exemption to taxation.
   • Absurd Consequence: Tax obligations become optional, reducing revenue for essential services; and potentially collapsing public infrastructure.
   • Conclusion: FCP, if applied consistently, invalidates the legal basis of collective civic duty; leading to the erosion of the state.

These reductios expose several fatal problems with the FCP. It cannot disciminate between noble and harmful beliefs without undermining its own claim to neutrality. It opens the door to systematic injustice when used by those with prejudiced, irrational, or desctructive worldviews. It undermines equal protection and legal consistency, allowing conscience to override the law. And it assumes beliefs are always morally justified because they are "deeply felt". The reductios show that if we accept the Freedom of Conscience Principle without strict limits, we are forced to accept racism, child abuse, public dysfunction, theocracies, and health neglect. These are logically entailed consequences, not exaggerations, that reveal the principle is unaccaptably broad, epistemically naive, and socially dangerous. Furthermore, when you chain multiple "freedom of conscience" claims together, especially in a complex society, you don't just get isolated absurdities; you get cascading system failures. These show how, under the Freedom of Conscience Principle (FCP), society becomes ungovernable, inequitable, and dysfunctional due to clashing and mutually incompatible deeply held beliefs. Consider this absurdity:

1. DMV Refusal Based on Gender: A Muslim DMV clerk holds a deeply held religious belief that women should not drive. When a woman comes to renew her license, he refuses to process the application. "I cannot, in good conscience, assist in enabling female autonomy that contradicts my interpretation of Sharia."
2. Public Transit Blocked by Libertarian Belief: The woman decides to rely on public transportation. However, the local transit system has been shut down because a libertarian city councilor has a deeply held belief that government-provided services are immoral and foster dependence. "The free market, not government, should solve mobility problems. Subsidized buses violate my conscience."
3. Medical Delay by Christian Science Administrator: Unable to drive, she misses a specialist appointment. When she finally arrives at the hospital, the administrator, a devout Christian Scientist, has introduced policies deprioritizing “material medicine” in favor of spiritual healing. "Antibiotics are a denial of God’s power. My conscience will not permit enabling secular medicine."
4. Ambulance Refusal by Conscientious EMT: Her condition worsens. She calls for an ambulance — but the on-duty EMT refuses service to unmarried women without a male chaperone, based on his religious beliefs. "My deeply held belief is that modesty and moral order must be preserved. I cannot be alone with an unrelated woman."
5. No Legal Recourse: She tries to sue. But the judge assigned to her case is a fundamentalist who believes women shouldn’t testify in court without a male guardian. "Scripture prohibits me from recognizing a woman’s legal standing without male oversight."

A woman is denied a license, stripped of public transit, denied medical care, refused emergency servies, and barred from legal remedy all because of a domino chain of conflicting "deeply held beliefs", each protected under the same freedom of conscience framework. Beliefs do not operate in isolation. In complex systems, protecting one person’s conscience can infringe drastically on another’s basic rights. The FCP lacks a mechanism for resolving conflicts between conscience claims. Civic collapse becomes inevitable if every public actor can act on private belief without external constraint. Pluralism turns into paralysis, where no shared norms govern behavior and no authority can function. The absurdity is not just in any one belief, but in the structural consequences of a society governed by unbounded conscience exemptions. If everyone can act according to conscience, then Everyone can deny everyone else their rights, in good faith. This chained scenario weaponizes pluralism against itself and exposes the Freedom of Conscience Principle as logically and socially incoherent when applied at scale.

At the beginning I mentioned the political use of this argument. It is often weaponized in service of a persecution narrative, especially among fundamentalist groups who find their ability to impose their values limited by pluralistic legal norms. This dynamic reveals that the "freedom of conscience" argument is frequently not about conscience at all, but about power, particularly the power to withhold rights from others under the cover of moral authority. Fundamentalist actors often use "freedom of conscience" to reframe their loss of dominance as a form of oppression. The logic goes “If I am not allowed to deny services to someone whose identity or behavior I morally disapprove of, I am being oppressed.” This reframes equality under law as a threat to religious identity, when in fact, it is a check on theocratic control over public life. The argument misframes oppression as victimhood. When a public servant refuses to perform their duty (e.g., issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples), they aren’t passively abstaining — they’re exercising state power by withholding it. Refusal to act is not neutral, its a denial of someone elses legal rights, an expression of superiority, and a political performance of martyrdom. They convert a legal infraction into a moral spectable, reinforcing the narrative that “My faith is under siege because I am being punished for living it.” The "freedom of conscience" defense is often mobilized selectively. It’s invoked not to protect marginal or powerless beliefs, but to entrench dominant religious norms. It tends to emerge only when state neutrality begins to protect minorities (e.g., LGBTQ+ people, women, religious nonbelievers), making it less about "freedom" and more about retaining cultural hegemony. It essentially is a role reversal between the perpetrator and victim. The person who was denied the service becomes invisible, while the public official who did the denying becomes the victim (while simultaneously becoming a martyr for their cause). Fundamentally, "conscience" in these cases, becomes a license to deny, marginalize, or punish those outside a specific moral framework. You will never see conscience claims appear in defense of pacifists refusing military funding, Buddhists rejecting factory farming, or Atheists objecting to religious tax exemptions. This pattern reveals its selective use, not as a principle, but as a tool of ideological enforcement. It's just an argument that's used as a symbol in culture war nonsense. Its a mechanism to invert accountability. It functions purely as a means of emboldening a voter base for political ends; the argument by itself is absurd. 

As mentioned earlier, one of the biggest risks is the precedent for other conflicting exemptions. The principle collapses immediately under conflict. As soon as two or more conscience claims clash, the system faces a choice; either pick a winner (which contradicts the premise of equal respect for all conscience claims), or refuse to adjudicate, which leads to paralysis or injustice. What actually happens, is that advocates resort to special pleading, insisting their conscience is more genuine, more sacred, more harmed, or more historically grounded. This is inconsistent, arbitrary, and self-defeating. If all deeply held beliefs are supposed to be treated equally, then the principle can’t help when a clerks belief tells them to deny service and a citizens belief tells them they are entitled to it. The FCP provides no mechanism for adjudicating whose belief matters more. So instead of justice, we get an impasse, discrimination, or ad-hoc rulings. For example, a Christian baker refuses to bake a cake for a gay couple, citing conscience. The gay couple believes strongly in equal dignity and non-discrimination. Whose conscience wins? Well, what usually happens is that one party's belief is framed as "sacred" while the others is "political or emotional" and hence illegitimate. That’s special pleading, it treats religious beliefs as privileged by default, and secular or identity-based beliefs as secondary; which undermines the concept of "equality under the law", creating second-class citizens. To maintain fairness, you'd need to universally apply the freedom of conscience principle to everyone’s sincerely held beliefs. But once you do, you face impossible contradictions. If everyone's conscience is valid, law loses authority. If only some consciences are valid, the principle loses credibility; it's self-defeating. So either the principle leads to anarchy, or to covert bias in who gets exemptions. Patterns of special pleading might include:

• “My belief is religious; yours is ideological.” (As if religious beliefs aren’t ideological.)
• “Mine is non-negotiable; yours is optional.” (Usually decided by cultural familiarity, not logic.)
• “I’m being coerced; you’re just uncomfortable.” (Even when both parties face comparable harms.) 
• “My tradition is old and sacred; yours is new and political.” (Age of belief is used as a proxy for legitimacy.)

These are not principled distinctions, they are tactical justifications to elevate some beliefs over others. What this reveals is that freedom of conscience is often treated not as a universal principle, but as a tool of moral hierarchy. Its defenders typically assume some beliefs are more equal than others. This violates the internal logic of the principle itself, and exposes it as incoherent when used for legal exemptions. When conscience claims conflict, they often devolve into special pleading.

The concept of freedom of conscience is generally interpreted as part of the broader protections provided by the First Amendment, particularly in relation to religion and speech. The First Amendment states:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The free exercise clause, "...or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...", protects individuals' rights to practice their religion freely, without interference from the government. This protection is often interpreted to include the freedom of conscience, allowing individuals to act (or refrain from acting) according to their religious or moral beliefs. While not explicitly mentioned, the concept is often derived from the combination of the Free Exercise Clause and the broader protections for individual expression. This understanding has been developed through legal interpretations and court rulings over time, where the courts have often recognized that freedom of conscience includes the right to hold and act on personal moral or religious beliefs, particularly in cases involving religious exemptions. There are several cases illustrating how the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to protect religious beliefs and practices, while balancing them against the governments interests. The case of Kim Davis is a notable example of the tension between religious freedom and the enforcement of civil rights laws. Kim Davis was the elected county clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky. In 2015, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, Davis refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, citing her religious beliefs as a Christian. Davis argued that issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples would violate her religious beliefs, and she sought an exemption based on her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. To avoid endorsing same-sex marriage, she instructed her office to stop issuing marriage licenses altogether, whether to same-sex or opposite-sex couples. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Davis by couples who were denied marriage licenses. A federal judge ordered Davis to issue the licenses, but she continued to refuse, claiming that doing so would be an endorsement of same-sex marriage, which conflicted with her conscience and religious beliefs. As a result, Davis was found in contempt of court and was jailed for five days in September 2015 for refusing to comply with the court’s order. While Davis was in jail, her deputy clerks issued the marriage licenses, and eventually, the state of Kentucky altered the forms to remove the clerk’s name, which resolved Davis's specific objection. After her release, Davis did not interfere with the issuance of licenses by her deputies. Davis’s case highlighted the conflict between an individual’s right to religious freedom and their obligations as a public official. The courts ruled that, as an elected official, Davis had a duty to carry out the law, which included issuing marriage licenses to all eligible couples, regardless of her personal beliefs. The court determined that her refusal to issue licenses was a violation of the law, and her religious beliefs did not exempt her from performing her official duties. Some argued that if Davis were allowed to refuse to issue marriage licenses based on her religious beliefs, it would amount to the government endorsing a specific religious view, thereby violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Davis’s defense was based on the concept of freedom of conscience under the Free Exercise Clause, asserting that her actions were protected because they stemmed from deeply held religious beliefs. However, the courts ruled that her duties as a public official required her to uphold the law impartially. The case garnered national attention and sparked debates over religious freedom, LGBTQ+ rights, and the role of personal beliefs in public service.

In the Kim Davis case, I think its abundantly clear that the Freedom of Conscience principle laughably breaks down. However, this did not stop political pundits from using this case within a broader narrative of Christian persecution. The narrative frames the legal requirement for public officials to comply with anti-discrimination laws as a form of persecution against Christians. This perspective suggests that Christians are being forced to act against their beliefs, thereby positioning them as victims of an oppressive legal system. In reality, the legal requirements apply equally to all, regardless of religious belief, but the narrative selectively interprets these requirements as targeted attacks on Christianity. The argument often presents religious freedom as being under attack when public officials are not granted exemptions based on their beliefs. However, it overlooks the broader context where other religions or non-religious beliefs are not given the same consideration. This selective interpretation reinforces the idea that only Christian beliefs are being undermined, contributing to the perception of persecution. High-profile cases like Kim Davis’s are often used to argue that the legal system is biased against Christians. This misrepresentation ignores the fact that the legal system is upholding principles of equality and non-discrimination. The narrative suggests that Christians are unfairly targeted, even though the legal outcomes are based on the need to apply the law equally to all citizens, regardless of religious belief. By misrepresenting legal outcomes, it amplifies the false notion that Christians are victimized within the legal system. Conservative media outlets and commentators often amplify these cases, framing them as evidence of a broader societal trend against Christians. This amplification not only fuels the perception of persecution but also mobilizes political and social movements that seek to roll back protections for other groups under the guise of defending religious freedom. When the media perpetuates these persecution narratives, it has manifest outcomes; for example, the "Eradicating Anti-Christian Bias" bill passed by the executive branch. The persecution narrative often relies on straw man arguments and false dilemmas. For example, by claiming that Christians are being persecuted for merely practicing their faith, the narrative ignores the nuance that public officials are being asked to perform their duties impartially. This misuse of logic perpetuates the idea that there is a direct conflict between being a Christian and being a public servant, which is not necessarily the case.

This is why I've been trying to reiterate the fact that this argument is more of a political tool than a carefully considered derivation of a principle. 

Generally, arguments against allowing freedom of conscience to override legal obligations fall into one of these buckets:

1. Erosion of the Rule of Law: Critics argue that allowing freedom of conscience to justify non-compliance with generally applicable laws undermines the rule of law. If individuals or entities can opt out of legal obligations based on personal beliefs, it could lead to legal inconsistency and weaken the authority of the law.
2. Potential for Discrimination: A major concern is that allowing religious or moral exemptions can lead to discrimination against marginalized groups. For instance, if businesses can refuse service to LGBTQ+ individuals based on religious beliefs, it would effectively legalize discrimination, violating civil rights protections and creating unequal treatment under the law.
3. Establishment Clause Violations: Some argue that accommodating religious beliefs in a way that impacts others can lead to violations of the Establishment Clause. If the government grants exemptions that favor certain religious practices, it may be seen as endorsing or establishing religion, which the First Amendment prohibits.
4. Harm to Third Parties: Opponents of broad conscience exemptions argue that they often impose significant burdens on third parties who do not share the same beliefs. For example, employees might lose access to health benefits, or customers might be denied services, which could result in real harm to their rights and well-being.
5. Neutrality and Equality: The principle of neutrality in the application of laws is a cornerstone of the legal system. Dissenters argue that allowing religious exemptions undermines this principle by giving preferential treatment to those who claim religious or moral objections, thereby creating inequality before the law.
6. Slippery Slope: There is a fear that if religious or moral exemptions are too readily granted, it could lead to a slippery slope where individuals and businesses seek exemptions from a wide range of laws, not just those related to religious practice. This could erode protections against discrimination and weaken the enforcement of laws intended to protect public health, safety, and welfare.

Okay so summarizing all of this, in principle the "Conscience" consideration is of interest, but as applied in this argument, it's political ramifications, and its strategic use by political actors, the argument amounts to nothing more than garbage. Instead of identifying legit uses of the principle, demarcating its applicability, identifying edge cases, explicating the criteria by which we evaluate cases, and possibly reconceptualizing it all together, discussion around this topic centers around the politicized argument that rests on unworkable assumptions that lead to absurdity.