On the Act of Defining

This post was inspired by conversations I've had recently with Trump supporters. The question of whether Trump is a Fascist frequently gets brought up, not just within these conversations, but within the broader American culture. Something very interesting happened in these conversations. One person said "Trump is not a fascist because he has not killed 12 million Jews". I found this implicit definition of Fascism quite striking, and puzzling. I responded by saying "killing Jews is not necessarily a feature of fascism. What the Nazis specifically did doesn't define Fascism more broadly considering figures like Franco and Salazar." They responded by saying "then what's an objective definition of Fascism?" They were really stressing this "objective" aspect of the term. I found this quite interesting because it revealed a significant misunderstanding of what definitions are, how we use them, and more broadly how concepts are used and evolve. I think they also crucially misunderstood the notion of "objectivity", as if there can be a mind independent definition of a political ideology. I wanted to elaborate on this because for starters, people frequently misunderstand the notion of objectivity, contrasted with subjectivity. There are different senses of these terms, which I'll elaborate on later, but something can be objective or subjective in either an ontological or epistemic sense. Furthermore, there are different types of definitions. These different types are used in different circumstances depending on the subject matter under discussion. I'll first start with a basic view of Fascism and then integrate these essential concepts. 

Defining Fascism and Definitions in General

Let's start with one of the preeminent scholars who study Fascism; Roger Griffin. In his book "Fascism", he leverages a concept from Max Weber called the "Ideal Type". Weber was a German sociologist who introduced "ideal types" as a methodological tool used to understand abstract notions like "Democracy", "Capitalism" etc. From the perspective of a systems analysis, we might think of the "Ideal Type" as a pattern of system architecture that reoccurs in many instances; each instance loosely related and defined at broad levels of abstraction. Griffin uses the "Ideal Type" similarly when defining Fascism; not as a checklist of characteristics every fascist movement must meet, but as a heuristic model to compare real-world movements against. This is crucial, because this method of defining is distinct from classical philosophical approaches that seek to find "essences" in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Griffin explicitly emphasizes that his definition of fascism as a form of palingenetic ultranationalism, a revolutionary movement that seeks national rebirth after a perceived period of decline, is an ideal type, not an exhaustive set of features. The concept of the “ideal type” is one of the most influential methodological tools in the social sciences. It plays a particularly important role in the study of complex social phenomena like fascism, where rigid definitions often fall short. An ideal type is a conceptual, analytical construct that highlights the most significant features of a social phenomenon. It does not claim to describe any real-world case exactly but serves as a theoretical model against which real-world instances can be compared. The word "ideal" in this context refers to an "idealization" of a concept; exaggerated for analytical purposes. In social sciences, ideal types are used for comparative analysis; they provide baselines or benchmarks for comparing real world cases that allows use to avoid overgeneralization while enabling categorization. 

As mentioned in the prior paragraph, the ideal type is a distinct way of defining a concept and is distinct from other methods of defining. Nominal definitions are straightforward statements of what a word means in common usage. These are very easy to communicate (and is probably what my interlocutor meant when they were looking for something "objective"). However, they are often way too vague or simplistic for complex social phenomena. If we define Fascism as a form of authoritarian government characterized by dictatorial power, this will overlap with many regimes that are non-fascist. Essentialist definitions attempt to identify essential properties that make a thing what it is. This is what philosophers have tried to do for thousands of years, before Wittgenstein identified this fundamental issue. Essentialist definitions can be too rigid or exclusionary, often ignoring variation and historical context. So for example, if we define fascism as fundamentally being racist or militaristic, we might exclude actual fascist movements that lacked these. Family Resemblance definitions are those defined by overlapping features, not a single essence. Wittgenstein introduces the problematic example of defining a "Game"; showing that simple terms like this are often difficult to define in essentialist terms, often leading to absurdities. This typically isn't thought of as a "method" of defining. Within the broader context of his critique of analytical philosophy, Wittgenstein was critiquing a misunderstanding of language. Nevertheless, it's useful to think of this idea of overlapping traits, and many in the cognitive sciences have extended this notion. George Lakoff introduces Prototype Theory, a theory of categorization that radically diverges from how categorization was conceptualized throughout antiquity. Instead of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions, think of most typical exemplars as defining a broader category. Not only is this highly confirmed empirically in cognitive sciences (it's how our brains function), computational linguistics leverages this notion based on semantic clustering. More generally, this is just a more intuitive notion of natural language. The ideal type is neither an empirical average nor an exact description, but a conceptual lens that brings clarity to complex and diverse phenomena. In contrast to essentialist or dictionary definitions, it accepts that no real case perfectly fits, but insists there’s a central dynamic or inner logic worth identifying. For Griffin, this makes it the most effective way to grasp the nature of fascism.

When thinking about the act of giving a definition or establishing a definition, it's become apparent that “definition” is a polysemous term. There are many different types of definitions; even more so than what we've described thus far. Because of this, the type of definition used or established in a dialogue or discussion, in some sense determines the direction of the discussion or argument; the types of dialectical moves available to each speaker once the definition is established. It’s not just the content of the definition determining the flow of conversation, but the type. For example, a mathematically precise definition will constrain an argument in ways that an ideal type definition will not. This also implies that definitions can impose constraints on discourse, which implies certain arguments will be ruled out apriori. For example, some more types of definition include the following:

1. Stipulative definitions are created when a speaker or writer introduces a new term or assigns a specific meaning to an existing term for a particular purpose or discussion. These definitions do not aim to reflect common or dictionary usage but instead serve to establish a clear and controlled use of language in a given context. For example, a researcher might define "microaggression" in a unique way tailored to their study, even if that definition differs from popular or academic norms. The key feature is that stipulative definitions are neither true nor false, they are simply proposals for how a term will be used within a specific discourse.
2. Lexical definitions aim to capture the conventional or commonly accepted meaning of a word as it is used in everyday language or documented in dictionaries. They are descriptive, not prescriptive, and serve to clarify how people generally understand a term. For instance, a lexical definition of "dog" would be something like "a domesticated carnivorous mammal with a barking sound, often kept as a pet or used for work." These definitions help avoid misunderstandings by appealing to shared linguistic norms and are useful in everyday conversation, reading, and writing.
3. Precising definitions are used to reduce the vagueness of a term by specifying it more clearly within a particular context. They are especially important in legal, scientific, or academic settings where ambiguity can lead to confusion or misinterpretation. For example, the term "adult" may be vaguely understood as someone who is mature, but a precising definition might state that an adult is "a person 18 years of age or older" in the context of voting rights. Unlike stipulative definitions, they are anchored to existing meanings but make them more exact for functional purposes.
4. Theoretical definitions place a term within a broader conceptual or scientific framework, often explaining not just what a term means, but how it functions within a particular theory. These definitions help articulate complex ideas and are foundational in fields like physics, psychology, and philosophy. For example, defining "intelligence" in psychology as "the capacity to learn, understand, and apply knowledge to adapt to new situations" integrates the term into a specific psychological theory. Theoretical definitions are often contentious and can evolve as the underlying theory changes.
5. Operational definitions describe a concept in terms of the specific procedures or measurements used to observe or quantify it. Common in scientific and experimental contexts, these definitions ensure clarity and replicability. For instance, "stress" might be operationally defined as "the level of cortisol in a subject's saliva measured at specific intervals." These definitions are crucial for empirical research because they provide concrete criteria for what counts as an instance of the concept being studied, allowing others to test and replicate findings.
6. Persuasive or rhetorical definitions are crafted to influence the audience’s attitudes, emotions, or beliefs about a subject. They go beyond merely explaining a term and instead embed evaluative or emotionally charged language to sway opinion. For example, defining "taxation" as "the government’s confiscation of citizens’ earnings" carries a negative connotation designed to provoke opposition, whereas calling it "a shared contribution to the public good" frames it positively. These definitions often appear in political or ideological debates, where the goal is to shape perception rather than clarify meaning objectively.

The Function and Practice of Defining

Each type serves a different pragmatic role. So, when one is introduced, it doesn’t just clarify, it frames the argument space. Definitions function as constraints on discourse. To define is to draw boundaries, and once those boundaries are accepted, certain moves become permissible, impermissible, or compelled (necessary consequences of accepting a definition). A mathematical definition (say, of a group in algebra) immediately limits what can be said or inferred about the object. You can’t argue that a particular group must be finite unless you've built that into your definition. An ideal-type definition (like Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy) allows more interpretive and evaluative discussion, it provides a kind of measuring stick, not a strict boundary. So the form of the definition constrains the dialectical space; what kinds of counterexamples are admissible, what kinds of arguments are compelling, what sort of “moves” are available to a participant in the dialogue. Recognizing that the type of definition shapes discourse implies a deeper rhetorical and philosophical point: choosing a definition-type is itself a strategic or ideological move. In debates (ethical, political, scientific), disputes often hinge less on facts and more on which type of definition governs the terms of the debate. Someone might offer a stipulative definition to get a discussion off the ground, but if others treat it as lexical or persuasive, conflicts arise. Definitions are not neutral clarifications but foundational moves in the structure of discourse. The type of definition deployed determines the logical, rhetorical, and epistemological space of the ensuing dialogue. For terms like fascism, the meta-debate over which kind of definition is appropriate is often more foundational than any first-order claim. Being aware of this gives one the power to question and reframe arguments at a deeper level. I'm not making the claim that all acts of defining are arbitrary, but that we must consider the context and term under consideration when evaluating or thinking critically about definitions. 

There is also an aspect of “weak sense” or “strong sense” of a term, or definition. If I provide a definition of a term in its “weak sense”, I am committing myself to less, versus a strong sense definition. Therefore, this “strength” of the sense of a term will constrain or direct the flow of a conversation and hence our understanding. When you define a term in a strong sense, you are committing to a more rigid or specific use of the term, are often excluding borderline or marginal cases, and impose higher standards for application. When you define in a weak sense, you are allowing for more flexibility, ambiguity, or range of application. This means that you enable broader inclusion, possibly at the expense of diluting precision. This has the implication that it's more difficult to argue rigorously using the term. "Democracy" in a strong sense might require direct citizen participation, equality of influence, and accountability mechanisms. In a weak sense, it may just mean periodic elections with competing parties. This “strength” or “sense-weight” can direct the flow of the conversation, which affects not just what can be said, but how and why. It determines the mode of reasoning. Weak definitions allow broad entry points into dialogue but reduce the possibility of sharp critique or conclusive differentiation; which entails the mode of reasoning is more interpretive or expansive. Strong definitions often allow rigorous argument and clear distinctions, but make consensus harder and can shut down conversation prematurely if not shared; implying the mode of reasoning is more analytical and rigorous. The stronger the sense of a term you use, the greater your burden in defending it. Strong definitions often require more justification, are more vulnerable to counterexample, and can appear ideologically loaded. 

Essentially, there are two axes shaping discourse; the type of definition and the strength of its sense. These axes determine what questions can be asked, what counts as a counterexample, and which conclusions are possible. 

Lets now tie this back to Roger Griffin and explicitly compare his way of defining Fascism compared to common attempts that use operational or ostensive definitions. From "The Nature of Fascism", Griffin defines fascism as "a political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism." Palingenesis comes from the Greek "palin" (again) and "genesis" (birth). This is the myth of a national rebirth after a period of perceived decadence or decline. Ultranationalism is a form of nationalism that seeks not just pride in the nation, but its purification, renewal, and often racial or cultural homogeneity. It is populist and revolutionary; it positions itself as a mass movement that will overthrow a corrupt or decaying status quo, not conserve it. This definition allows us to understand fascism as a revolutionary modernist movement, not merely an authoritarian regime or military dictatorship.

How is this distinct from other types of definitions? Operational definitions seek to define a concept by how it is measured or observed in practice. These are common in scientific discourse or engineering. We can already somewhat see how this will fail. Under this view, "Fascism is present if a regime abolishes elections, suppresses dissent, uses paramilitary forces, and promotes nationalist rhetoric." These risk missing the ideological or mythic dimension. A regime might be authoritarian without being fascist; for example, a Monarchy. His ideal type highlights the motivating myth behind fascism, not just its behaviors. He doesn’t reduce fascism to empirical traits like censorship or uniforms; although these often follow from fascist policies. In a similar vein, ostensive definitions define concepts by pointing to examples. They are often circular and vague, only working if you agree on the examples. They tell you nothing about what binds the examples under the same grouping. Griffin doesn’t simply list fascist regimes. He seeks the inner logic connecting them, the myth of national rebirth as the engine of fascist action; despite different instances of fascism looking different in practice. At the beginning of this blog post, I mentioned my interlocutors working definition. This is a clear example of an ostensive definition, but even more specific in that it isolates the application of the term to specific atrocities of the Nazis. 

I personally like Griffins approach because it avoids concept creep and over-specificity. Concept creep happens when a term becomes stretched to apply to more and more phenomena, eventually losing its analytical precision. Griffin avoids this by focusing on the core myth. He excludes traditional conservatism (which seeks preservation, not rebirth), generic authoritarianism (which might lack a redemptive national myth), and mere racism or xenophobia (not all racist ideologies are fascist). His approach accounts for many forms of self identifying fascist regimes throughout history without imposing rigid necessary and sufficient traits; crucially, it allows for variation within the core myth. Simultaneously, he keeps boundaries clear and provides us with a guide for comparative analysis. Lets consider an example and then compare Griffins approach to another scholar, who represents a very different way of conceptualizing fascism, more in the tradition of moral-political critique than strict conceptual precision. 

The Iron Guard (also known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael) was a Romanian fascist movement active mainly in the 1930s–40s. Lets see how it fits Griffins definition: 

1. Palingenetic Myth: The Iron Guard preached the spiritual and moral rebirth of the Romanian nation. They believed Romania had fallen into corruption, secularism, and decay, and required a cleansing national revolution. This was not just political reform, but a regenerative crusade, deeply mystical and tied to Orthodox Christianity. 
2. Ultranationalism: Emphasis on ethnic purity, Romanian supremacy, and the mythic continuity of the Romanian people. Jews, Hungarians, and others were seen as enemies of the national soul. The movement glorified death, martyrdom, and national sacrifice.
3. Populist-Revolutionary Character: The Iron Guard was anti-parliamentarian, anti-liberal, anti-bourgeois, and aimed to mobilize a new mass elite. They used paramilitary violence and had a cult of charismatic leadership (Codreanu).

Even though Romania never had a long-standing fascist regime like Italy or Germany, the Iron Guard clearly fits Griffin’s ideal type: Revolutionary, Myth-driven, Mass-based aimed at national rebirth through purification. This shows the strength of the ideal type: it captures real ideological dynamics, not just regime characteristics (like dictatorship or militarism), which might not be fully present.

Definition by Enumerating Features and Observed Behavior

An enumerative definition explains what a term means by listing its members, and you can also use it to list a thing’s key properties and functions, as long as the meaning is still being conveyed through a roster of specifics rather than a single general rule. In other words, instead of saying what something is “in principle,” you define it by naming what it includes or does: for a category, that might be a complete set (like the Great Lakes: Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario) or representative examples; for a particular thing, it could be a straightforward inventory of its notable traits and roles (e.g., a smartphone as a touchscreen, a camera, a microphone, a speaker, wireless radios, an operating system, plus functions like calling, messaging, web browsing, navigation, and photo/video capture). This approach is clear and concrete, but it can be limited when the list is long, incomplete, or the boundaries of what “counts” are fuzzy or change over time.

Jason Stanley, in How Fascism Works, takes a rhetorical-political approach; utilizing this enumerative strategy. He focuses on fascist tactics and strategies of propaganda, especially in democratic or semi-democratic contexts. This differs from Griffin dramatically, because Griffin asserts, contrary to many, that fascism has elements of a coherent ideology. Stanley, and many others, define fascism as a set of tactics, not as an internally coherent ideology (as opposed to something like Liberalism, Marxism, etc.) Stanley focuses on appeals to a glorious past, attacks on truth/reason, division of society into "us" vs "them", deeply anti-intellectual, and cult of a leader. Stanley uses "fascism" as a moral indictment, not just an analytical category. He also prioritizes function over structure; how rhetorical strategies of fascists create authoritarian attitudes. Jason Stanley outlines 10 key tactics or features that characterize fascist political movements. Importantly, Stanley does not claim these are strict necessary and sufficient conditions for fascism, nor that all must be present for a movement to be fascist. Rather, these are recurring strategies, rhetorical moves, and cultural patterns that create a fascist environment:

1. The Mythic Past: Fascist politics relies on a mythologized version of the past, a time when the nation was "pure," strong, and united. The past is portrayed as morally superior, often ethnically homogeneous, and under threat from outsiders. Real historical complexity is erased in favor of a narrative of national glory and decline. Fascist leaders promise to "make the nation great again" by returning to this idealized past. This undermines historical truth and fosters nostalgia as political fuel and is often aligned with revisionist history, denial of past crimes, or glorification of conquest.
2. Propaganda: Fascist regimes flood the public with repetitive, emotionally charged messaging that separates “us” from “them” and obscures reality. They do this through the use of state-controlled or partisan media, memes, slogans, and misinformation; promoting emotional resonance over factual accuracy. Repetition and rhetorical simplicity are key tools ("lock her up", "enemies of the people"). This weakens the public’s ability to distinguish truth from fiction and creates an epistemic crisis where reality becomes contested terrain, ultimately undermining public trust in journalism, science, and education.
3. Anti-Intellectualism: Fascist politics discredits reason, expertise, and higher education, promoting instead “common sense” or “gut feelings.” Academics, journalists, scientists are portrayed as elitist, corrupt, or enemies of the people. Intellectuals are accused of spreading lies or undermining traditional values. Fascist movements promote anti-expertise populism, where all opinions are treated as equally valid. They delegitimize critical thinking and complex debate and empowers demagogues who speak simply and emotionally, also undermining democratic institutions like courts and universities.
4. Unreality: Fascism creates a false, emotionally resonant worldview that replaces shared reality with ideological fiction. The flood the zone with disinformation to cause confusion and exhaustion, creating alternative realities through conspiracy theories and false flags. Lying is normalized as a political tool. This is a problem because it destroys intersubjective agreement, which democracy relies on, makes reasoned political discourse impossible and encourages a post-truth culture where power trumps evidence.
5. Hierarchy: Fascist politics promotes a strict social and racial hierarchy where some people are inherently superior. It emphasizes masculinity, race, religion, or nationality as signs of superiority, argues that egalitarianism weakens society, and is often tied to white nationalism, patriarchy, and religious supremacy. This results in the justification of discrimination, exclusion, and violence. It makes inequality seem natural or even virtuous and undermines the core democratic principle of equal dignity.
6. Victimhood: The dominant group is portrayed as the real victim, despite its power or privilege. It usually employs persecution myths. It uses various mechanisms such as claiming that the majority is under attack by minorities, immigrants, or global elites. This turns grievance into moral justification for retaliation, deploying resentment politics as a rallying force. In practice, this implies excuses oppression as self-defense and encourages retribution and scapegoating.
7. Law and Order: Fascist politics invokes law and order to justify repression and state violence, especially against minorities and dissenters. Fascists focus on crime, immigration, riots, and protests to stoke fear. They use selective enforcement of law (e.g., targeting leftist groups, overlooking right-wing violence) and elevate police and military as heroic defenders of the nation, turning justice into punishment. Fascists legitimize state brutality and surveillance and equates dissent with anarchy or terrorism.
8. Sexual Anxiety: Fascism exploits gender roles, masculinity, and sexual norms to define national identity and suppress deviance. It promotes traditional family structures as the backbone of the nation, demonizing LGBTQ+ identities, feminism, and sexual liberalism. Sexual “deviance” is framed as a threat to national purity. Encourages patriarchy and heteronormativity as moral imperatives. Ties gender discipline to nationalism. Fuels moral panic as a political weapon.
9. Sodom and Gomorrah: Urban centers are portrayed as sites of decay, sin, and corruption, while rural areas represent moral purity. Cities are seen as controlled by cosmopolitan elites, immigrants, and degenerates. The countryside is framed as the true heart of the nation. Encourages anti-urban, anti-cosmopolitan sentiment. Splits society along urban/rural, elite/populist lines. Delegitimizes cities as centers of diversity and innovation, aligning fascism with rural traditionalism.
10. Work and Nation: Fascism links labor and national identity, where only certain types of work are valued. It elevates manual labor, military service, and industrial work as morally superior and devalues intellectual or artistic labor. Immigrants or minorities seen as either stealing jobs or not working hard enough and treats work as a moral test of national belonging. Dismisses welfare, disability, or artistic labor as unpatriotic.

 

Feature	Roger Griffin	Jason Stanley
Conceptual Goal	Build a theoretical ideal type of fascism	Identify dangerous political rhetoric and patterns
Core Concept	Palingenetic ultranationalism	Authoritarian tactics + propaganda strategies
Definition Style	Ideal type (Weberian)	Ostensive, functional, rhetorical
Historical Emphasis	Fascism as a specific 20th-century ideology	Fascist tendencies can recur in new forms
Moral Tone	Analytically neutral (non-normative)	Explicitly moral and warning-based
Conceptual Rigour	High (seeks boundaries to avoid concept creep)	Lower (risk of concept creep through analogy)
Examples	Mussolini, Hitler, Iron Guard, etc.	Trump, Orban, Fox News, etc. (often controversial)

 

Umberto Eco’s concept of Ur-Fascism (1995) is one of the most widely cited attempts to define fascism culturally and psychologically, rather than ideologically or historically. It differs significantly from Roger Griffin’s ideal type, and also from Jason Stanley’s approach, though there’s some overlap with Stanley. Let’s unpack it and compare. Eco doesn’t offer a strict definition of fascism. Instead, he provides a list of 14 features that he says characterize what he calls “Ur-Fascism” (Eternal Fascism) the primordial, recurring form of fascist mentality or culture. He emphasizes that “These features cannot be organized into a system; many of them contradict each other, and are also typical of other kinds of despotism or fanaticism.” Below are his list of key features (see original):

1. Cult of tradition: The idea that all that can be learned about the truth, has been learned. There is no room for novel interpretation or refinement of ideas. Tradition determines everything. 
2. Rejection of modernism (while paradoxically using modern tools): The development of western culture since the enlightenment has been a dive into depravity, while simultaneously uses the technological developments as a sign of national strength. Ur Fascism can be thought of as deep irrationalism and Anti-Intellectualism. 
3. Action for action’s sake: Building on the irrationalism, there is a deep desire to act without reflection. Action is inherently good. Consequently, critical attitudes are seen as suspect. Fascists deeply distrust the intellectual world. Phrases like "degenerate intellectuals" are used; as they are seen to have betrayed "traditional values". This builds on the dogmatic attitude from number one; why reflect when there is no room for thought outside of tradition (narrowly defined by them).
4. Disagreement is treason: Modern scientific establishments praise disagreement as one of the key pillars to improve knowledge. Dogmatic ideology rooted in unwavering adherence to tradition cannot withstand criticism.
5. Fear of difference: self explanatory; xenophobic fears against foreigners or immigrants. However, in many cases, it can be "the enemy within".
6. Appeal to a frustrated middle class: A class struggling from economic crisis or feelings of hopelessness, alienation. Stoke a sense of fear that lower classes/groups are their enemy. The petty bourgeois, especially ones who were once proletarians. 
7. Obsession with conspiracy: Or an obsession with a plot, in many cases an international plot; think international bankers. In our era, think the ESG conspiracy, World Economic Forum conspiracy, Covid shots as the "mark of the beast" etc. 
8. Enemies as both strong and weak: Fascists will play up the power of enemies while simultaneously dismissing them as inferior. In the United States, a great example is Schrodinger's immigrant, the idea that immigrants are somehow "taking" jobs away from Americans while simultaneously sponging off the welfare state. 
9. Pacifism is trafficking with the enemy: There is always an enemy to fight, there is always a permanent war. Negotiation and compromise are extensions of the fourth principle about disagreement. Not nihilistic, but apocalyptic in their view of international and domestic affairs. Enemies must be defeated, the nation must triumph. 
10. Contempt for the weak: I cannot describe this better than Eco himself, so here is the quote: "Elitism is a typical aspect of any reactionary ideology, insofar as it is fundamentally aristocratic, and aristocratic and militaristic elitism cruelly implies contempt for the weak. Ur-Fascism can only advocate a popular elitism. Every citizen belongs to the best people of the world, the members of the party are the best among the citizens, every citizen can (or ought to) become a member of the party. But there cannot be patricians without plebeians. In fact, the Leader, knowing that his power was not delegated to him democratically but was conquered by force, also knows that his force is based upon the weakness of the masses; they are so weak as to need and deserve a ruler. Since the group is hierarchically organized (according to a military model), every subordinate leader despises his own underlings, and each of them despises his inferiors. This reinforces the sense of mass elitism." This is a very deep narcissistic tribalism. 
11. Heroism and death cult: The best way I can describe how this occurs in American culture is through Pete Hegseth's referral to military troops as "warriors", and the desire to engage in a Holy War with our enemies. Eco describes the Italian fascists ad glorifying death, a heroic death. 
12. Machismo and weapon fetishism: The disdain for women and intolerance of nonstandard sexual habits. We can see this in modern times with the so-called Red Pill movement (Manosphere) and the rise of the Incel movement. Both of these are deeply anti-feminist in all of its variations. 
13. Selective populism: "the people, conceived monolithically, have a common will, distinct from and superior to the viewpoint of any individual. As no mass of people can ever be truly unanimous, the leader holds himself out as the interpreter of the popular will (though truly he alone dictates it). Fascists use this concept to delegitimize democratic institutions they accuse of "no longer represent[ing] the voice of the people"." Eco specifically writes, "Wherever a politician casts doubt on the legitimacy of a parliament because it no longer represents the Voice of the People, we can smell Ur-Fascism." This is a reiteration of the anti-democratic tendencies recognized earlier. 
14. Newspeak / degraded language: Invented by Orwell, describes the use of impoverished vocabulary, with the goal of limiting critical thinking. I think this is also an extension of its anti-intellectual and anti-elitist tendencies. 
    

Comparing Griffin to Eco:

Dimension	Roger Griffin (Ideal Type)	Umberto Eco (Ur-Fascism)
Core Concept	Palingenetic ultranationalism (national rebirth myth)	Cultural/psychological features of authoritarian or fascist thinking
Definition Style	Ideal type (Weberian model)	Family resemblance + ostensive (Wittgensteinian leanings)
Analytical Purpose	Comparative political science and historical clarity	Cultural/philosophical warning against fascist tendencies
Focus	Ideology + revolutionary politics	Cultural patterns, rhetoric, mentality
Boundaries of Fascism	Clear and structured; excludes non-palingenetic movements	Blurred; even democratic societies can harbor Ur-Fascism
View on Modern Relevance	Fascism can re-emerge but must be ideologically coherent	Ur-Fascism is always latent, potentially reactivating anytime
Strength	Conceptual rigor, avoids overreach	Captures subtler, cultural forms of fascist sentiment
Limitation	May exclude borderline cases (e.g., cultural fascism without regime)	Risk of concept creep and rhetorical inflation

Comparing all three scholars, we see a common emphasis of foundational myth making. They all stress the invention of a glorious, often fictional, past. Griffin doesn't include this in his definition, but Stanley and Eco both recognize the anti-intellectual and anti-pluralism aspects; both see fascism as hostile to complexity, nuance, and dissent. Perhaps this is implicit in Griffins definition, given that ultranationalism tends to entail anti-intellectualism. Both Eco and Stanley highlight the use of propagandistic methods that emphasize an "us versus them" mentality, using feat to justify exclusion or violence. They both emphasize the authoritarian personality structure of the movement as well. Eco is informed by historical instances of fascism in continental Europe while Stanely focuses on modern movements. 

Scholar	Main Lens	Methodology	View of Fascism	Relevance Today
Griffin	Ideological (palingenetic myth)	Ideal type	A specific revolutionary nationalist ideology	Rare but possible in new forms
Eco	Cultural-psychological	Family resemblance	A recurring authoritarian impulse in human culture	Always latent; can appear in small cultural signs
Stanley	Rhetorical-political tactics	Functional/ostensive	A style of politics that undermines democracy	Actively re-emerging in democratic societies

Philosophical Methods of Defining

Neither Eco nor Stanley is using a genus-species (or classical Aristotelian) model of definition. Instead, they’re offering something closer to enumerative or family resemblance definitions, and the distinction between these types of definitions is key to understanding their conceptual strategies.

Genus-Species definitions work by specifying the genus (category it belongs to) and the differentia (the specific features that distinguish it from other members of that genus). So a definition simply is the Genus plus the specific difference. For example, a human is defined as a rational animal; the genus is Animal and the differentia is Rationality (what sets us apart from other animals). This is a fine way of defining concepts like technical terms but doesn't handle historically fluid phenomena like "fascism", where there are likely no necessary and sufficient conditions applicable but the Genus-Species model requires. Enumerative definitions work differently. This model defines a concept by listing features or typical examples without asserting all the features must always be present. It is rooted in patterns, associates, and similarities that might overlap but are not identical. This handles real world complexity but might lack precision and is at risk of concept creep if the criteria are not strict enough. These types of definitions are difficult to apply in cases of binary classification. 

Neither Stanley or Eco use genus + differentia (“Fascism is a type of X defined by Y”) because on their view the concept of fascism is not stable or essentialist enough to support that form. Instead, they use enumerative patterns of resemblance and function. Stanely's definition is enumerative and functional, aimed at diagnosing real-world authoritarian drift. Eco's is more cultural-philosophical than taxonomical; focusing on a collection of reoccurring features but at the cultural and psychological level. 

In philosophy, the distinction between essence and accident is used to clarify what fundamentally defines a concept versus what is merely incidental. The essence of a thing refers to the set of necessary characteristics without which it would not be what it is, these are the core attributes that all instances of the concept must share. For example, the essence of a triangle is having three sides; remove that, and it’s no longer a triangle. In contrast, accidental properties are those that a thing can possess or lack without changing its identity, such as a triangle being red or large. These features are contingent and not part of the concept’s defining nature. When philosophers define concepts, they aim to isolate essential properties while setting aside accidents, ensuring clarity and precision in understanding and categorization. This distinction plays a crucial role across areas like metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, shaping how we define, analyze, and engage with ideas. It should be clear that neither Eco or Stanley are giving essentialist definitions and I cannot stress this enough because, like mentioned earlier, this has implications for how we evaluate their criteria, how far the concept can be extended, and what arguments can be derived from such definitions. Essentialist definitions give us the ability to construct deductive arguments from the definition, enabling precise classification. Eco and Stanley's approach does not enable this ability. Their definitional approach lends itself to interpretive, probabilistic, plausibilistic, or analogical arguments, which are more context-sensitive and less universally binding. These reasoning patterns are fundamentally evaluated differently from formal deductions, so it's important to be clear about the type of definition underpinning some argument about fascism. 

You might be wondering: "Griffin's approach sure seems similar to the essentialist approach". His emphasis on palingenetic ultranationalism seems to resemble something of an essentialist definition. There is a subtle but core distinction between the Ideal Type approach and essentialism. Griffin is not claiming there to be some metaphysical notion of essence defining fascism; it does not have an inherent or timeless nature like a natural kind. In fact, he emphasizes that fascist movements cannot occur without modernization of a nation state, meaning that fascist movements are contingent on historical context. Griffin is identifying functional or conceptual invariants across different instances of fascism; a core ideological engine that drives these movements. He is not claiming that there is an ontological essence of fascism. While the essentialist approach to definition and Max Weber’s concept of the “ideal type” may both involve identifying key characteristics of a concept, they diverge significantly in purpose and philosophical grounding. As mentioned earlier, essentialist definitions aim to capture the necessary and sufficient conditions that make something what it is; its essence. The goal is to define a concept in a way that applies universally and precisely, often with the assumption that the concept corresponds to a real, stable kind in the world. In contrast, Weber’s ideal type is a heuristic tool, not a claim about an underlying essence. It is a theoretical construct that deliberately simplifies and exaggerates certain features of a phenomenon in order to make sense of complex social reality. The ideal type does not describe any single real-world instance perfectly; rather, it provides a conceptual benchmark against which empirical cases can be compared, showing how they deviate or conform. So while both approaches involve identifying defining features, essentialist definitions aim for precise classification and deductive reasoning, whereas ideal types are used for interpretive analysis and comparative understanding in social science. In short, essentialism seeks what something is, while Weberian ideal types help us make sense of what things tend to look like in varied and messy real-world contexts.

To put it another way, instead of identifying an essence, the ideal type builds a conceptual model based on patterns, a stylized, exaggerated construct that reflects the most characteristic features of a phenomenon. For example, an alternative ideal type of fascism might include ultranationalism, authoritarian leadership, mythic appeals to national rebirth, and suppression of dissent. These features don’t appear in every fascist regime in the same way, but together they form a recognizable pattern. Importantly, ideal types can also be understood as system archetypes; that is, models that reveal recurring structures or dynamics within social systems. Like feedback loops in systems thinking, ideal types help us identify the tendencies and relationships that shape behavior across different contexts. They don’t tell us what fascism is in an essentialist sense, but they help us understand how it functions and evolves across time and place. In doing so, the ideal type avoids the classic philosophical problem of essence vs. accident; not by resolving it, but by rendering it irrelevant. It’s not about classifying reality into fixed categories; it’s about building models that make complex systems more intelligible.

Griffin's ideal type avoids rigidity of classical definitions that demand necessary and sufficient conditions, avoids essentialist because he is not claiming fascism has a natural or metaphysical essence, and allows for defeasible classification since some cases are clearly fascist while others are debatable. It strips away historical contingencies while identifying core structural elements to all fascist movements. 

Typologies and Taxonomies

A taxonomy is a classification scheme: it sorts entities into bins according to explicit criteria (often hierarchical: genus → species → subspecies). The core goal is ordering a field so that items can be placed (membership decisions), categories can be nested (varying levels of generality), and the system can support consistent comparison. A taxonomy can be purely practical (“for archiving”) or theory-laden (“these are natural kinds”). But the hallmark is: it’s primarily a mapping from cases → categories.

A typology is typically a model of variation built from types that may be idealized (accentuating a pattern), combinable (cases can share many features), graded (more/less typical), and sometimes explicitly non-exhaustive (it's ok if border cases exist). In the social sciences, “type” often functions as an ideal type (in the Weberian sense): not “the average case,” but a conceptual accentuation that helps you see structure in messy reality. So whereas taxonomies often aim at clean placement, typologies often aim at analytic leverage. You can ask not only “is it fascism?” but “how fascist is it, and in what ways?” You can represent a phenomenon as a cluster of traits rather than a single essence.

A definition (especially in analytic writing) usually tries to fix the meaning of a term by specifying necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, or some looser rule like family resemblance. Typologies sit next to definitions and do work that strict definitions struggle with. Typologies can handle heterogeneity (fascism varies by nation, period, regime etc.), they can make comparisons possible without pretending uniformity (by comparing degrees or profiles), and they can expose dimensions/aspects of the entity under examination. Definitions set boundaries and enable inference but struggle with what typologies can do. Typologies often contain implicit definitions (like cluster concepts). Definitions can resemble typologies, especially enumerative definitions. Minimalist definitions maximize boundary-clarity but risk missing important variation; typologies maximize descriptive power but risk becoming a “bag of traits” unless they’re disciplined.

Now that we have some introductory concepts out of the way, why do I bring this up? Stanley G. Payne is another scholar of fascism that provides a typology of generic fascism, dividing it into three headings: Ideology & Goals, Fascist Negations, and Style & Organization. 

1. Ideology and Goals (what it affirms and aims at): Payne’s first feature foregrounds fascism as a positive project, not just a reaction. You can see the “typological” move here; these are not all strict necessary-and-sufficient criteria stated as a tight formula; they are a profile that lets you compare movements that share “family” traits but differ in emphasis.

•  An idealist/vitalist/voluntarist orientation, tied to creating a “new” modern culture (often secular and self-consciously regenerated).
• A new nationalist authoritarian state, not simply a restoration of traditional monarchy/aristocracy.
• A regulated, integrated national economy (often described as corporatist / national socialist / national syndicalist depending on country).
• A positive valuation of violence/war (or at least readiness to use them).
• Expansion / empire / radical revision of international position.

2. Fascist Negations: Payne also builds fascism as a triple rejection; anti-liberalism, anti-communism, and anti-conservatism (with important caveats to this last one). Methodologically, this is a boundary tool: it helps prevent collapsing fascism into generic right-authoritarianism (“conservatism with uniforms”) and prevents collapsing it into generic anti-left reaction.

3. Style and Organization (How it does politics): This section is crucial because it treats fascism as a mode of political practice, not just an ideology:

• Mass mobilization + militarization of politics, aspiring to a mass party-militia form. 
• Aestheticized politics (symbols, liturgy, emotional/mystical elements).
• Cult of masculinity / male dominance + an “organic” view of society.
• Exaltation of youth and generational rupture. 
• Charismatic authoritarian command style (often personalist).

Payne also offers a condensed definition emphasizing revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth, vitalism, elitism, mass mobilization, the Führerprinzip, and the positive valuation of violence/war. Notice what happens when you compress a typology into one sentence: you gain boundary clarity, but you lose some of the typology’s “multi-angle” descriptive advantages. His typology highlights fascism as a syndrome of ideology, organization, and political aesthetic. He stresses the importance of style alongside policy. 

While typologies are useful, they run the risk of becoming a static checklist. The typology might tempt a reader to treat fascism as a fixed bundle, rather than a process that radicalizes, opportunistically compromises, or mutates between movement and regime. Notice the emphasis on process; I'll be describing in the next session scholarly work that takes into consideration process aspects, seeing fascism as a pattern that can be broken down into stages. 

Griffin is famous for a deliberately parsimonious generic definition: fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core is a palingenetic (rebirth) form of populist ultranationalism. Griffin’s move is essentially: stop arguing over long trait lists; identify the minimum that makes fascism fascism; the rebirth myth fused to populist ultranationalism. A widely-noted advantage of this approach is economy (Ockham’s razor): fewer variables, clearer conceptual boundary, less dependence on “anti-X” criteria. But because it’s minimalist and ideational, it can under-specify organizational forms, political style & aesthetics, and the messy coalition dynamics with conservatives, churches, militaries, and capital. It can also invite disputes about whether “rebirth language” is always present explicitly, or whether it’s being read in by the analyst. Payne optimizes for comparative mapping: fascism is a patterned configuration across ideology/goals, negations, and style/organization. Griffin optimizes for clarity and simplicity. Griffin’s “mythic core” tells you what fascism means itself to be; a regenerative revolution. Payne insists that to understand fascism as a historical phenomenon you must include how it organizes and performs politics (mass mobilization, militarized style, charismatic command, political liturgy). Griffin sharpens conceptual identity; Payne thickens phenomenological description.

Fundamentally, either approach (and this is true more generally) is the "correct" one depending on the analytical interest of the inquirer. Griffins minimalist approach can mask the importance of institutional form and political practice, but that might be fine for the purposes of inquiry. A rich typology might obfuscate a unique ideological kernel (root cause), but allow for rich comparisons based on structured patterns. Griffin and Payne therefore, provide descriptions more suitable for different stages of a dialogue. 

Lifecycle and Developmental Models

Robert Paxton is another widely read author on the study of Fascism who focuses on the political context and functional development of Fascism. In "The Five Stages of Fascism", Paxton argues that you don’t understand fascism best by treating it as a stable ideological object; you understand it by tracking what it does as it develops: movement formation → political rooting → seizure of power → exercise of power → (radicalization or entropy). Paxton explicitly worries that stage-based analysis can slide into a nominalism of processes unless the “imperative of definition” is met; he flags the awkwardness that “fascism” acts differently across stages and that this raises the question of which stage counts as “real fascism.” So his method is simultaneously an attempt to avoid purely static trait-checklists, and a recognition that you still need a definition to keep the category from dissolving.

He lists five paradigmatic stages of fascist movements:

1. Intellectual exploration, where disillusionment with popular democracy manifests itself in discussions of lost national vigor
2. Rooting, where a fascist movement, aided by political deadlock and polarization, becomes a player on the national stage
3. Arrival to power, where conservatives seeking to control rising leftist opposition invite fascists to share power
4. Exercise of power, where the movement and its charismatic leader control the state in balance with state institutions such as the police and traditional elites such as the clergy and business magnates.
5. Radicalization or entropy, where the state either becomes increasingly radical, as did Nazi Germany, or slips into traditional authoritarian rule, as did Fascist Italy.

His “five stages/phases” is a process/lifecycle model first, and only later does he distill that process into a definition that’s explicitly behavioral/mechanistic rather than “ideological-essence” or “trait-cluster.” I find this "developmental" approach striking, because it seems to overlap extensively with post Great Recession United States; especially when considering the backlash to the bi-partisan approaches to resolving the economic disaster. It's very possible we are at some stage of this developmental process.

Later, in "The Anatomy of Fascism", Paxton attempted to refine this into a more concise definition. He defines it as:

Fascism may be defined as a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.

When Paxton offers this generic definition, he does it in a deliberately behavioral register: fascism is “a form of political behavior” marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline/humiliation/victimhood and compensatory cults of unity/energy/purity, etc. Methodologically, that’s a mechanism-forward definition; not "the essence is X doctrine" and not "the type has traits A/B/C" but “the phenomenon is identifiable by a patterned dynamic of mobilization, fear/victimhood, purification, and political practice.” In other words: he “defines” fascism in a way that’s meant to remain stable across the lifecycle, while still treating the lifecycle as essential to understanding how fascism realizes itself historically. 

Payne’s well known typological grid (ideology/goals; negations; style/organization) is designed to support comparative classification across cases with different emphases—i.e., fascism as a clustered profile you can map and compare. The strength is rich, multi-dimensional description that makes cross-case comparison easier. This comes at the risk of it can feel “static”, a bundle of traits, unless you separately theorize how the bundle emerges, mutates, or gets institutionalized. Paxton is doing something closer to historical sociology of power: how movements enter alliances, how they get “rooted” in a political system, how rule changes them, and how outcomes diverge (radicalization vs. entropy). His approach explains fascism as a trajectory—and makes coalition dynamics and state capture central. But it too has limitations: if you lean only on stages, your concept can get fuzzy (“is an early-stage movement ‘fascist’ yet?”), hence his insistence you still need definition.

Griffin’s approach is almost the inverse of Paxton’s in emphasis. He compresses “generic fascism” into an ideological kernel—palingenetic (rebirth) populist ultranationalism—the “fascist minimum.” Paxton provides a process/mechanism characterization: understand fascism by its political behavior and developmental logic; definition is behavioral and historically grounded. Neither of these is "more correct" than the other; they serve different purposes and have differing strengths and limitations. Griffins method can under-specify institutional pathways and coalition dynamics (how fascists interact with conservatives, militaries, bureaucracies) because those are not part of the ideological minimum. Paxton can under-specify what is uniquely diagnostic at time-zero (early movements) because the most revealing features may only fully appear later—hence his “which stage is real fascism?” worry.

Paxtons lifecycle/process and behavioral definition allows for historical explanation of emergence, consolidation, and outcomes. It's definition is grounded in behavior and mobilizing mechanisms. The stages are a model of developmental mechanisms (how fascism grows and transforms). I find this definition striking, because it maps cleanly onto post-2021 politics in the United States. We see obvious examples of preoccupation with decline and victimhood (Anti-Christian bias), obsession with purity, tons of nationalism, and a very loose but effective coalition with traditional elites in the republican party and business.

Objective and Subjective Definitions

Moving on from the various attempts to define fascism for a bit, I'd like to now touch on a point I mentioned earlier about the "objectivity" of definitions. Based on my description of the act of defining, categorization, and reference, it should be no surprise that this idea of an "objective" definition is somewhat trivial. In what sense can anything be "objective"? What is the set of possible things that can be called "objective"? In set theoretic terms, the predicate "is objective" is to denote a collection of propositions that stand in categorical opposition to something we might call "subjective". I've belabored this distinction in a prior post, but I think it should be revisited because the word "objective" tends to be used as a conversation stopper, rather than a designation of some property of an object. It's used in an authoritative tone typically without regard to whether that label is applicable. This becomes especially problematic when we attempt to apply the label to something nebulous like fascism. 

Ontological objectivity and subjectivity concerns what exists independently of human minds. Ontologically objective entities are things that exist regardless of beliefs or perspectives; things like the moon, or this tree outside my window. Ontologically subjective things depend on human consciousness or institutions. Some might call these "social constructions", but they refer to things like money, marriage, ideologies, and language. From the ontological sense of the term, it should be clear that fascism, as a political ideology, is ontologically subjective. It exists as part of human social and ideological systems. There is no "objective" independent thing called "fascism" out there in the world in a mind-independent objective sense. 

Epistemic objectivity and subjectivity concern how we know things, and whether our knowledge claims are rationally justifiable, intersubjective, and evidence based. A claim is epistemically objective if it can be assessed using shared standards of reason and evidence. A claim is epistemically subjective if it relies on tastes, feelings, or private experience. We can make epistemically objective claims of fascism, such as the case with the Iron Guard, but our definition of fascism itself will always have interpretive and contestable elements because it emerges from human history, not natural law. 

The desire for an "objective definition" of fascism reflects a scientific-realist model of language: the idea that words refer directly to things with essential properties, like how “water” refers to H2O. But political concepts don’t work this way. Terms like fascism, democracy, freedom, terrorism, justice are what W.B. Gallie called “essentially contested concepts”, their meaning is inherently debatable because they are historically and socially constructed, value laden, and their use is strategic and rhetorical as much as it is descriptive. So, the demand for an "objective" definition of fascism misses the point: definitions are not discovered, they are constructed and justified through use, argument, and historical analysis. Definitions in political theory are tools for inquiry and persuasion, not mirrors that perfectly reflect external truths. They shape how we see the world: calling someone a fascist is never neutral, it positions them within a moral and historical narrative. If we define it too narrowly (e.g., “must kill 12 million people”), we render the concept useless for understanding how fascism begins or adapts. Fascism isn’t like a chemical compound with a fixed formula. It’s a historically rooted political ideology whose meaning must be reconstructed from the movements that identified with it, like Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany. Scholars like Roger Griffin build ideal types to capture its core logic, like the myth of national rebirth through revolution, rather than reduce it to a checklist of atrocities. That’s how we reach definitions that are intellectually rigorous and historically grounded, even if they’re not ‘objective’ in the way gravity or atoms are.

I always refer to Douglas Walton's work on informal logic, so here I'll do the same. Implicit redefinitions are a type of persuasive definition that happens when someone subtly shifts the meaning of a term mid-argument. This is connected with presumptive reasoning; "fascism" as used in everyday discussion is usually conditional on a presumptive definition that is defeasible. For example, someone might claim that "fascism means genocide. Trump does not commit genocide, therefore the classification is inapplicable". But this smuggles in a high evidentiary threshold which shuts down discussion. In this example, the threshold is presumptive and ought to be interrogated. These sorts of dialectical moves occur constantly. Definitions often smuggle in arguments by framing a concept in moral or political terms (“freedom” as market deregulation), setting up straw men (defining socialism as government tyranny), or framing the boundaries of discourse (“If you call this fascism, then you must believe all strong leaders are fascists”). In the end, definitions are not just about truth, but about use: What work does the definition do? Does it clarify or obscure? Does it advance inquiry or shut it down? Is it inclusive enough to capture historical variety, yet precise enough to exclude unrelated cases? Definitions have a pragmatic element. So when someone demands an “objective definition,” they may be treating definitions as fixed epistemic anchors, rather than tools of reasoning. But philosophy teaches us that definitions are part of interpretive, defeasible reasoning that often contain implicit arguments. Good definitions are those that serve pragmatic goals of inquiry, explanation, and inquiry. In the case of fascism, insisting on a mind-independent, once-and-for-all definition is a category error. It ignores the historical, rhetorical, and normative complexity of the term.

Theory Driven Definitions

I want to pivot back to defining fascism, but now we will look at it from a Marxist perspective. This is crucial because Marxists define fascism fundamentally differently from what we have seen thus far with Griffin, Stanley, and Eco. The Marxist definition of fascism is an implication, or logical consequence, of accepting core theoretical postulates of Marxist theory. This is an absolutely crucial distinction, because it raises questions about whether definitions can be theory independent of if they're always theory laden in some fundamental way. 

Marxist interpretations of fascism diverge sharply from liberal or cultural approaches by grounding their analysis in class struggle, capitalist crisis, and material conditions rather than ideology alone. From this perspective, fascism is not just an authoritarian regime or a nationalist movement, it is a specific response by monopoly capital to systemic threats from the working class. As famously articulated by the Communist International in 1935, fascism is “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital.” That is, fascism arises when liberal-democratic institutions can no longer contain social unrest or preserve capitalist profits, prompting the ruling class to abandon democracy in favor of violent repression. Marxists also stress that fascism draws its mass base primarily from the economically squeezed petite bourgeoisie, small business owners, professionals, and others caught between capital and labor, who are prone to reactionary politics when facing downward mobility. Thinkers like Gramsci, Trotsky, and Zetkin highlight how fascism functions as a counter-revolutionary force: while it may claim to oppose elites, it ultimately serves to destroy proletarian movements and secure capitalist rule. Rather than viewing fascism as an anomaly or break from liberalism, Marxists argue it is a symptom of capitalism in crisis, a “capitalism in decay” that resorts to dictatorship when democratic methods fail to sustain the system.

This is a radically different way of understanding fascism. On this view, fascism is an outgrowth of capitalist systems coupled with liberal democracies. The "seeds" of fascism are embedded within the logic of the economic system. Notice that this conceptualization rests on theoretical concepts; these words like "capitalist crisis" mean something very specific within Marxist theory. The definition is intrinsically connected to a system of concepts, it only makes sense because of these background concepts. This raises the question of whether any definitional strategy can be independent of a system of concepts. Marxist definitions of fascism are embedded within a broader theoretical framework, class struggle, modes of production, capitalist crisis, ideology critique. They don’t just define fascism; they situate it within a system of concepts. So the question becomes: can one define something like fascism without such a conceptual system?

A definition is "theory-laden" if it depends on a background conceptual framework, draws meaning from that frameworks internal logic, and cannot be understood or justified in isolation from that framework. For example, "neurosis" means something very specific from a Freudian perspective. Or from a Christian perspective, something being "good" is inherently connected to a broader theistic view that incorporates narratives, historical assumptions, and theological constructs such as "sin". Strictly speaking, "sin" doesn't make much sense outside of the Christian plausibility structure, because "transgression against God" assumes a specific model of god, which is deeply coupled with the broader set of presuppositions. Even Griffin's definition in some deep sense depends on a theoretical model. He operates within a Weberian social science tradition, he relies on concepts like modernity, political myth, populist ultranationalism, and revolutionary regeneration which are not self-evident or theory-free. His work implicitly privileges ideological dynamics over economic structure, which is a theoretical choice. It's not clear whether anything can be theory independent. Especially for contested, historically embedded, evaluative concepts like fascism. There is no "view from no where", all definitions rest upon assumptions about what matters. Even lexical definitions are snapshots of socially embedded linguistic practices, not neutral referents. We can still reason objectively but not in a sense of discovering a single true definition. Instead, we look for definitions that have presumed "good" qualities such as:

• Conceptual clarity: What is this definition trying to capture?
• Explanatory power: How well does it make sense of the cases?
• Pragmatic usefulness: Does it help us understand, compare, or resist fascism?
• Consistency and transparency: Are its assumptions clear?

I'll come back to definition standards later. Next, I want to analyze the Marxist approach. I actually think the Marxist approach is highly informative.

Marxist Approaches to Defining Fascism

I'd like to discuss the idea of theoretically laden concepts, in relation to how Marxists define fascism. As an economist myself, I find this extremely insightful. It directly challenges some of the views I hold, which makes me reconsider whether I should adopt some of these theoretical constructs. 

In The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism, Clara E. Mattei offers a compelling analysis of the interplay between economic policy and political authoritarianism, particularly focusing on post-World War I Italy. While Mattei does not provide a singular, formal definition of fascism, she conceptualizes it as a political regime that emerges to safeguard capitalist interests during periods of social upheaval. In her view, fascism is characterized by the suppression of working-class movements and the reinforcement of hierarchical economic structures, often under the guise of national unity and order. Mattei argues that fascism is intrinsically linked to specific economic conditions, particularly those involving threats to capitalist structures. She posits that austerity measures, such as cuts to public spending, wages, and social benefits, were not merely economic strategies but deliberate political tools employed to discipline labor and dismantle emerging forms of economic democracy. By enforcing austerity, economic elites aimed to reassert control and prevent the redistribution of power and resources that could arise from socialist or worker-led initiatives. Mattei provides a causal account of the relationship between austerity and the rise of fascism. She contends that austerity policies were instrumental in creating the conditions necessary for fascist regimes to gain and maintain power. By weakening labor movements and fostering economic insecurity, these policies undermined democratic institutions and facilitated the ascent of authoritarian governance. Her work underscores the idea that economic policies are not neutral but are deeply political and can have profound implications for the structure of society and the nature of governance.

Mattei makes a powerful and carefully argued case that fascism in Italy emerged as a political response to economic crises, but more specifically, as a strategic class project to suppress radical democratic and egalitarian challenges to capitalism after World War I. Her argument is deeply causal, not merely descriptive. After WW1, Italy was experiencing mass inflation and labor unrest. Officials were facing widespread demands for economic democracy, self-management of factories, land reform, and even socialist governance. This was a genuine threat to capitalist private property and class dominance. Mattei’s core thesis: Austerity was not a technocratic or neutral policy, but a deliberate disciplinary project. The “capital order” refers to the ideological and institutional system that defends capitalist relations of production. Economists, technocrats, and elites (e.g., at the Bank of Italy and in government ministries) used austerity, especially cuts to public spending, wages, and welfare, to discipline labor, undermine collective organizing, restore "investor confidence", and reassert bourgeois control over social unrest. Austerity paved the way for fascism by making liberal democracy incapable of responding to popular demands.

On this view, fascism is not an accidental outcome of austerity, but rather it's a political solution to the crisis of capitalist legitimacy. She argues that when liberal democratic institutions failed to fully repress the working class, fascism filled the vacuum. Fascism offered brutal physical suppression of labor movements (Blackshirt violence), nationalist ideology to obscure class antagonism, and a new political economy centered on order, productivity, and submission to the state, which was aligned with capitalist priorities. Fascism is not just compatible with austerity, it is its political fulfillment. Mattei shows that technocrats and economists lent legitimacy to fascist repression. She shows how economic discourse was used to frame austerity as "scientific and necessary", blame inflation on disorderly workers, not capital, and legitimize Mussolini's corporatist and anti-worker policies. Economists and elites essentially collaborated with fascism, not reluctantly but with enthusiasm, because it restored class power. Interestingly, Milton Friedman was the economic advisor to the Pinochet regime in Argentina, who retained dictatorial control over the country and whom many argued was fascist. Once Mussolini came to power, his regime intensified austerity, privatized services, eliminated unions, centralized power under a corporate state model. Mattei shows that fascism did not reverse austerity, it institutionalized it in a politically repressive, class authoritarian form. 

Her implied definition would be "A form of capitalist authoritarianism that emerges to violently suppress social democratic or revolutionary challenges, particularly through state-led discipline and nationalist legitimization." Fascism is not just a response to economic insecurity, but the class-authoritarian resolution to the crisis of capitalist hegemony. Austerity and fascism are part of the same project. I find this fascinating because many austerity programs have been correlated with the rise of neo-fascist movements following the 2008 global financial crisis. In broad terms, austerity policies created conditions of economic hardship, insecurity, and disillusionment with mainstream political elites, which far-right or neo-fascist movements exploited to gain legitimacy and power. In Greece, the "Golden Dawn" Nazi party gained significantly more votes after austerity programs were implemented. In Italy, Lega Nord and Fratelli d'Italia surged in popularity. In Spain, Vox rose to prominence. In France, the National Rally gained disturbingly strong support under Marine Le Pen. In Hungary, Fidesz under Viktor Orban began to centralize power. 

In all these cases, austerity programs weakened democratic trust, eroded social protections, delegitimized centrist politics, primed populations for narratives of scapegoating, nationalism, and strongman solutions. Far-right and neo-fascist groups weaponized these conditions to reassert racial, national, and gendered hierarchies. In short, austerity created the material and psychological preconditions for the revival of fascist-style politics, just as in the 1920s and 1930s. This is simply fascinating to me because I think Mattei is really hitting the nail on the head. While Griffin, Stanley, and Eco correctly describe many elements of fascism, Mattei shows us that these features of fascism are the consequence of an underlying economic structure that gives rise to palingenetic ultranationalist political rhetoric. Under normal economic conditions, people would be unaffected by this type of nonsense. But like in classic Marxist fashion, if there are problems with the economic base, we will see degenerate movements in the economic superstructure. From a Marxist point of view, political and cultural institutions are a function of the economic base. Fascism flows directly from a failing capitalist economic base. 

I think there is an aspect of historical formation that is usually neglected from conversations about fascism. We risk historical determinism if we claim for example that, nations that were once monarchies are likely to become fascist. We also can reduce fascism if we fail to identify neofascist mutations. The question of whether there is a path dependency to fascism is interesting, something I wont pursue. But, there must be some sort of background conditions required for a fascist movement to succeed. As mentioned earlier, I think this is why the Marxist perspective is attractive because it identifies conditions that make fascism more likely. More broadly, what convinces a population to become fascist? I’d imagine there is something to do with the use of religious imagery, symbolism, and theology as motivating factors. For example, Nazi ideology simply did not emerge independently and spontaneously from economic factors alone. Nationalist movements always scapegoat minorities but in order for the Nazi message to have been successful so quickly, there just have been preconditions or background conditions enabling the proliferation of scapegoating. Europe had largely been very anti-semitic for centuries, possibly due to people like Martin Luther in his “on Jews and their lies” among other theologies. Hitler then used concepts like the Aryan Jesus, essentially using centuries of theology as his launching point. There seem to be these sorts of preconditions unique to each fascist movement, non generalizable but act as INUS conditions for the emergence of fascism. If we accept Griffins definition, then seemingly the next question because "what enables palingenetic ultranationalism?" If we accept Mattei's analysis, what can we say about the various forms fascist movements take?  

The Nazis didn’t invent anti-Semitism, they inherited it. What they did was radicalize and racialize centuries of Christian theological anti-Judaism, which included blood libel myths, deicide narratives, and the notion of Jews as the internal enemy, spiritually and morally corrupt. In Luther's book, he advocated for burning synagogues, expelling Jews, and confiscating their texts. This formed a part of the cultural memory of Christian Germany, which Hitler later revived in racial, secularized terms.  Hitler and Nazi ideologues often invoked religious archetypes, even when operating within a secular pseudo-scientific racial framework. The "Aryan Jesus" myth recast Jesus as a Nordic rebel against Jewish corruption. The Third Reich was envisioned as a kind of apocalyptic fulfillment, the rebirth of a pure world after purging corruption. Italian Fascism also drew heavily on religious symbology. Mussolini drew on Roman imperial and Catholic imagery. Mussolini staged elaborate pageants and rituals invoking the myth of a resurgent Rome. He instrumentalized religious tradition. So when asking why fascism emerges successfully, we must attend to the symbolic and narrative raw material available in a given culture, the prejudices and archetypes long embedded in religious and social institutions, and the emotional and metaphysical structures fascism can plug into. This includes things like cultural scripts (stories of chosen people, betrayal, and spiritual warfare) and affective pathways (anger and a sense of humiliation). Contemporary far-right movements also use religious symbolism: Christian nationalism in the U.S., Orthodox-infused autocracy in Russia, or Hindu nationalism in India. They frame their politics in civilizational or eschatological terms, creating a sense that political conflict is cosmic, eternal, and absolute. Fascist movements don't just pop out of thin air, nor do they emerge in a vacuum. These conditions are not absolute. From a causal lens, if we say "what caused this fascist movement to grow, expand, and proliferate", these preconditions don't determine the outcome, they just seem to make the outcome much more likely. 

Additional Scholarly Approaches to Fascism

I think one of the problems of identifying modern fascism is that traditional definitions might not account for the evolution of fascist ideology. Fascism, like any virus, adapts to its environment. Spencer Sunshine's Neo-Nazi Terrorism and Countercultural Fascism: The Origins and Afterlife of James Mason’s Siege (Routledge, 2024) offers a compelling and nuanced exploration of how fascist ideology has evolved in the postwar era, particularly through the lens of James Mason’s Siege and its influence on contemporary neo-Nazi terrorism. Sunshine’s work extends the conceptual framework of fascism beyond the models proposed by scholars like Roger Griffin and Jason Stanley. While Griffin emphasizes the palingenetic ultranationalism at the core of fascist ideology, and Stanley focuses on the rhetorical and political strategies employed by fascist movements, Sunshine delves into the subcultural and countercultural dimensions that have allowed fascism to adapt and persist in new forms. He traces the transformation of Mason’s Siege from its origins in the 1970s American Nazi Party splinter groups to its resurgence in the 1980s and eventual adoption by contemporary neo-Nazi terrorist organizations like Atomwaffen Division. This trajectory illustrates how fascist ideology has been recontextualized within countercultural milieus, blending with elements of Satanism, occultism, and transgressive art. 

A significant contribution of Sunshine’s book is his analysis of how fascist ideology has infiltrated and co-opted countercultural spaces. He documents the roles of figures like Boyd Rice, Michael Moynihan, Adam Parfrey, and Nikolas Schreck in reviving and disseminating Siege, thereby bridging the gap between fringe cultural movements and violent neo-Nazi terrorism. This fusion has given rise to what Sunshine terms "countercultural fascism," characterized by a rejection of traditional political structures in favor of decentralized, leaderless resistance and a glorification of violence and chaos. Sunshine’s examination reveals that modern fascist movements are not merely political entities but are deeply embedded in cultural and subcultural networks. These networks facilitate the spread of extremist ideologies and provide a sense of identity and purpose to individuals drawn to radical beliefs. By highlighting the evolution of fascist ideology through countercultural channels, Sunshine challenges traditional definitions and encourages a broader understanding of how fascism adapts to contemporary contexts. His work underscores the importance of considering cultural and subcultural dynamics in the analysis of fascist movements, especially in an era where digital platforms and decentralized networks play a crucial role in radicalization processes. In summary, Neo-Nazi Terrorism and Countercultural Fascism extends the conceptualization of fascism by incorporating the cultural transformations and adaptations that have allowed it to persist and evolve. Sunshine’s interdisciplinary approach provides valuable insights into the modern manifestations of fascist ideology and the mechanisms through which it continues to pose a threat in contemporary society.

George Orwell's exploration of fascism, particularly in his essay "What is Fascism?" (1944) and the collection Fascism and Democracy, reveals his struggle to pin down a precise definition of the term. He observed that by the 1940s, "fascism" had become a catch-all label, often used to describe anything deemed undesirable or authoritarian. Orwell noted that the term was applied so broadly that it had lost specific meaning, being used to describe a wide array of subjects, from political figures to cultural practices . Orwell also highlighted the term's misuse in political discourse, where it was often employed more as an insult than a descriptor. He remarked that "fascist" had become synonymous with "bully" in the English vernacular, reflecting its dilution as a term of political analysis . People tend to misunderstand and overuse the term “fascism”, to be a stand-in for anything you don’t like, similar to how conservatives use the word “communism” to refer to any socially progressive policy. In a recent conversation, someone said to me that “Stalin was a fascist”. Now, this is hilarious on its face because of how ignorant of history the statement was. But it’s illuminating as well, because the term is so successful at being a substitute for “authoritarianism” that people cannot distinguish fascism from non-fascism. Never mind the fact that fascists hate communists, there is a right wing trend to label left wing extremism as fascism, obfuscating the fact that fascism is pretty much exclusively a right wing concept. "Fascism" has become a kind of semantic black hole: a label that absorbs meaning rather than clarifies it. When someone says "Stalin was a fascist," they are (perhaps unconsciously) revealing a deeper problem, the collapse of meaningful political language into free-floating moral condemnation. Fascism is fundamentally a right wing phenomenon, but people have obfuscated "authoritarianism" with "fascism". Fascism is palingenetic ultranationalism: the belief in a national rebirth, led by an organic, hierarchical community, purified of decadence, foreigners, or internal traitors. It’s anti-liberal, anti-socialist, and anti-democratic, but not just because it wants order, it wants regeneration, myth, and unity. Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Codreanu, Salazar, all saw themselves as defenders of tradition, race, nation, or spiritual essence, against modernity, Marxism, or cosmopolitanism. They were rooted in the reactionary right, though they often mobilized mass movements and populist rhetoric. Authoritarian socialism/communism (Stalin, Mao) often shares the form (repression, surveillance, personality cult), but not the content or ideological orientation.

Definition Quality

Can we construct a comprehensive set of criteria that tell us when a definition is "good"? Possibly; "good" can vary depending on the domain in which it's advanced, the kind of definition, and the purpose of the definition. Here is a collection of the major, widely recognized criteria across philosophy of language, logic, conceptual analysis, and political theory. It is quite comprehensive for evaluating general-purpose definitions, especially for complex, contested concepts like fascism.

• Clarity: A good definition should be clear and unambiguous. It should avoid vague language or subjective qualifiers unless those are part of what's being defined. Clarity ensure that people understand what is and isn't being referred to. 
• Coherence: a definition should be internally consistent and not self-contradictory. 
• Non Circularity: a definition should not define a term by itself or use synonyms that require the same explanation. 
• Explanatory Power: Especially for theoretic definitions, a good definition should help explain or unify a range of phenomena. It should organize known cases, clarify disputed ones, and predict or guide inquiry.
• Fruitfulness: A good definition should generate insight. It should help us see new connections, help diagnose new or emerging phenomena, and be applied more broadly beyond it's initial use. 
• Scope and Precision: Good definitions should neither be too broad nor too narrow. A good definition should have reasonable “grip” on the phenomena it’s trying to describe.
• Theoretical Embeddedness: Some definitions are theory-laden and must be evaluated in terms of how well they function within that theory. The value of a definition is partly relative to its theoretical context and its pragmatic goals. 
• Usefulness and Pragmatic Function: It should be clear what the purpose of the definition is. Is it to classify? To describe? To warn? Orwell was concerned that fascism had lost its pragmatic function; its usefulness as a political descriptor was eroded by vague overuse. 
• Definitional Stability: Good definitions offer some stability: they aren’t so vague or contested that they shift with every use. That said, some flexibility is valuable, especially for concepts that evolve over time (e.g., gender, democracy, even fascism). Definitions can be open-textured, but still anchored.
• Cognitive Accessibility: Is the definition graspable by the intended audience? This is especially important in public contexts. A highly rigorous definition may fail practically if it's too opaque. 
• Defeasibility or Revision Sensitivity:  Can the definition evolve in light of new cases, evidence, or counterexamples? This is crucial for living definitions like democracy, race, or fascism, which must balance stability with responsiveness.
• Boundary Sensitivity: Does the definition help clarify borderline or ambiguous cases? Can it handle gray zones effectively? A good definition should allow reasoning at the margins. 
• Reflexivity: Does the definition account for how the concept is used and received in society? Some definitions (especially in political discourse) function performatively, shaping reality as much as describing it.
• Frame Sensitivity: Is the definition using framing metaphors (fascism as a political cancer etc)? Does the definition differ depending on cultural memory and emotional resonance? A good definition does not just describe, it reveals how meaning is structured and experienced. 
• Clear Purpose: Definitions often don't just describe, they often serve rhetorical purposes, moral judgements, and have legal/policy implications. A good definition should be explicit about these intentions and motivations. 
• Captures Prototypical Features: The definition must identify features of the "common cases", the exemplary cases. This also allows for graded classification, especially useful for politicized terms.

Successfully defining fascism requires navigating between these considerations. Evaluating a classification depends indirectly on whether the definition is "good", and if the methodology used to determine the classification (gathering relevant information, constructing arguments etc.) is also "good".

Implications of Definition

To me the question “is trump a fascist” is best approached by comparing his actions to self identified fascists in history, prototypical fascists, or fascist adjacent figures. Based on relative similarities, we can defeasibly assign the label: it seems to me like the best we can do is use defeasible analogical arguments, comparing him to a broader set of fascists like Franco or Salazar, noting whether the similarities and dissimilarities are relevant according to some criteria. Or maybe we can do some sort of network analysis, looking at his local connections and their relative importance on his outlook. For example, suppose trump is influenced by JD Vance who is influenced by highly suspected fascists, we could infer trump has fascist tendencies based on this peer group. This is obviously problematic but it seems like these approaches could be practical. Here are the key components of the analogical approach:

• Reference class: Who counts as a paradigm case of fascism? Mussolini, Hitler, Codreanu, Franco, etc.
• Relevant features: Cult of personality, palingenetic myth, paramilitary groups, suppression of dissent, ultranationalism, mass mobilization
• Relevance criteria: Are the shared features causal, symbolic, structural?
• Weighting: Some features matter more than others (authoritarianism is common, but the palingenetic revolutionary myth is more diagnostically central per Griffin)

We could leverage features of the definitional strategies we have covered thus far to make an inference. For the network analysis and peer group inference, I'm essentially treating fascism not just as an ideology, but as a relational property detectable through influence patterns, discourse networks, and affiliation with fascist adjacent thinkers or movements. We could approach this using field theory or actor-network theory. Many actors dont explicitly identify as fascist, but their discursive ecosystem can still signal fascist tendencies. Influence is often mediated through multiple paths on a social network; for example Yarvin -> Vance -> Trump (Curtis Yarvin being the known fascist). We could also ask whether Trump is enabling or empowered by fascist networks. Perhaps we could even combine the analogical and network approach into a practical heuristic:

• Step 1: Analogical Mapping: Compare Trump to historical fascist figures using a grid of core traits (Griffin’s ideal type).
• Step 2: Relational Mapping: Analyze Trump’s ideological network; who he reads, appoints, echoes, or legitimizes.
• Step 3: Interpretive Weighting: Judge whether the aggregate similarities are politically, morally, or analytically sufficient to use the label “fascist,” “fascist-adjacent,” or “illiberal nationalist”.

I think an approach like this avoids definitional reductionism and concept creep. But prior to doing any of this, It seems that when we marshal evidence for the conclusion , we need to first establish whether that evidence is relevant. In Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning, David Schum explains that evidence must be established as such through a process of legitimation. It seems like this is important right now, because using the empirical approach , someone might disagree whether an action counts as evidence. But a simple method could be: ask self identified fascists if they resonate with trumps publicly stated positions, if they like or endorse trump, this is positive evidence for the proposition that he’s a fascist. Obviously it’s not conclusive alone, and it will depend on a network of other pieces of evidence, ultimately a cumulative case would yield the likelihood whether he’s a fascist or not. This line of evidence that  seems robust. Suppose someone thinks Kamala Harris is a communist, but many self identified communists do not recognize her as one, and she doesn’t use Marxist concepts in her speech, then we can take this to be negative evidence of her being a communist. If a person is accused of being X, but recognized practitioners of X do not accept that person as one of their own, that is negative testimonial evidence. Additionally, if the person does not use the language, symbols, or conceptual tools associated with X, that further lowers the posterior odds.

Not all empirical claims automatically count as "evidence." For something to function as evidence, it must undergo a process of legitimation. Evidence becomes relevant only when it can be connected to a hypothesis or conclusion via a credible inferential path. This often involves rules of relevance, background theories, and argumentation schemes (Douglas Walton also talks about this in dialogical logic). If someone says, “Trump spoke in favor of border walls,” that only becomes evidence of fascism if we link border nationalism to a theory or prototype of fascist ideology; otherwise, the data is just a free-floating observation and not evidence. This is why I think self-identification by known fascists could be highly confirming evidence. The idea is that if people who explicitly hold fascist beliefs resonate with or endorse Trump, this can be positive evidence that Trump’s positions align with fascist ideas, even if Trump himself does not claim the label. Of course, this is defeasible, there may be other explanations (fascists are opportunistically supporting a non-fascist figure). But it's still probative evidence. Ultimately, assigning the label will be probabilistic, conditional on negative and positive evidence. So according to a Bayesian cumulative approach, we could first set the prior probability based on general traits or context. Trump is a populist and a nationalist, but does not have revolutionary inclinations despite many of his supporters having these inclinations. Next, we can collect evidence; he is endorsed by fascist groups, his language is consistent with palingenetic myths, he uses law-and-order rhetoric and enjoys suppressing dissent. Finally, we update our posterior probability using Bayesian principles; at some threshold one is justified in saying "It is likely, unlikely that Trump is a fascist". 

Ultimately, if we assign the label “fascist” to someone holding a powerful position, this almost certainly implies we must take action. We know historically that fascists and fascist adjacent regimes are brutal, increasing the probability of oppression and suffering for out group members and “traitors” speaking against the regime . This seems intrinsically connected to decision theory. Suppose with high probability we conclude trump is a fascist, and his form of fascism is closely related to historically violent fascist movements, then it seems there is a cost of not acting. However, the immediate cost of acting is very high. You take on many risks, potentially at the expense of being wrong about your diagnosis. It seems like this factors into the analysis very deeply. So it’s interesting, many people conclude he’s a fascist but do nothing about it. But simultaneously it makes sense why someone wouldn’t act, because the individual cost is very high while the marginal impact of regime change seems low. Likewise, maybe some people don’t think it’s a problem, because in their mind “if it’s a problem, someone will alarm the bell” so to speak, but with group think, echo chambers, and risk of social ostracism, many people won’t speak out so there won’t be any social proof more broadly. Labeling a leader as “fascist” is not a morally neutral act. It implies that we have crossed a threshold of evidence, that the threat is not just theoretical but imminent, and that some form of resistance or defensive action may be necessary, Belief implies obligation, if you truly believe a fascist regime is emerging and you do nothing, you are complicit, unless you believe resistance is futile. Of course, people often act as if they don't believe what they say, not because they are lying but because belief is often partitioned from motivation when the expected utility of action is low, the personal cost is high, and there's an ambiguity or deferral or responsibility. There is a social epistemological aspect of inaction as well. People often wait for external validation but this can cause pluralistic ignorance, the bystander effect, and echo chambers. So even if many people independently diagnose fascism, the absence of visible collective action feeds the illusion that it’s not urgent, or that others don’t see it. This is why social proof becomes a bottleneck: if no one else is acting, people doubt their own assessment, or wait for institutional actors (courts, media, elites) to validate it, often after it’s too late.

Is Trump a Fascist

So, given all this preamble, is Trump fascist? This question should be rephrased: "to what extent does Trump and his political movement resemble the descriptions and characterizations of fascism described by scholars?" Remember, Fascism is the kind of thing that alludes definition. It's patterned behavior with an ideological kernel that takes different forms conditional on the history from which it emerges. It is characterized better as the "degree" to which some political movement corresponds with the archtypal elements. Any single person could very well not resemble fascism, but collectively be part of a fascist movement through shared associations. In order for this assessment to be grounded, I think we need to first map out the current state of right-wing politics and culture. We then need to look at the historical forces that gave rise to this distribution. Lastly, we can look at some of the behaviors and rhetoric prevelant within the movement to see if it maps onto fascist rhetoric.

1. Political Dimension

   • MAGA / America-First populist core - This is core mass of the movement: Trump-centered, anti-immigration, permanently aggrieved about 2020, and convinced the federal government is captured by enemies. It supplies the audience and emotional energy. Almost every other faction tries to speak to this base. MAGA itself symbolizes palingenetic rhetoric; we must "go back" to a time where things were ideal.

   • Christian nationalist restorationism - A current inside the right that wants the state to privilege a particular Christian (mostly conservative Protestant, sometimes charismatic) vision. It frames America as a Christian nation that’s been stolen by secular/globalist forces, and it’s now visible in staffing and rhetoric around Trump-world. Seven Mountains–style teaching — take media, education, government, family, religion, business, and arts — is a natural fit. (PBS) Fascists often leverage the religious symbolism of the society from which they emerge, and adapt it to their cause.

   • NatCon / post-fusionist “let’s actually govern” bloc - This is where Project 2025 lives: Heritage + ex-Trump officials producing a 900-page plan to centralize the executive, purge disloyal bureaucracy (Schedule-F style), kill off DEI, and advance Christian-right social priorities. It’s a way to make MAGA’s instincts administratively real. (American Civil Liberties Union) This maps cleanly onto power consolidation and creating an "us vs. them" culture.

   • Authoritarian legalism / personnel-first politics - Because they believe in a hostile “deep state,” they argue the next GOP administration must 1) massively increase presidential control over DOJ, FBI, FTC, etc., 2) pre-vet loyalists, and 3) be willing to punish perceived internal enemies. That’s the logic of Project 2025’s unitary-executive push. (Wikipedia)

   • Nativist–security hardliners - Border, “invasion,” mass-deportation planning — all of this hooks directly into the Great Replacement paranoia and makes it legible to normie GOP voters (“we’re being replaced → close the border”). It offers a “lawful” outlet for demographic fear. (PBS) This ties into the long historical tradition within the right to create a pure "True American" based on their culture war rhetoric.

   • Paramilitary / militia / Jan-6-adjacent layer - Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and likeminded militia networks acted as the action wing of Trumpist politics — exactly what DOJ proved in the seditious-conspiracy cases against Stewart Rhodes and the Proud Boys leadership. This shows how a political narrative (“stop the steal,” “save the country”) slid into organized force. And analysts now track a broader partisan, anti-government violence trend since 2016. (Department of Justice)

   • Tiny but influential elitist currents (NRx, monarchism, Yarvin/Thiel orbit) - These aren’t mass movements but they’ve given the right an idea that democracy is slow and captured, so smarter, more CEO-like rulers — even monarchic or city-state models — should run things. That harmonizes with MAGA’s desire for a super-presidency.

2. Social Dimension

   • Religious restoration blocks - This includes three major movements. There is the Evangelical/charismatic Christian nationalism branch; hyper-end-times-aware, spiritual-war framing → extremely compatible with “deep state” and “cabal” talk. Less obvious is the Radical-trad Catholic / Opus-Dei / integralist circles. They are more high-church, wants state power for “the common good,” often networked with NatCon thinkers and are often integrated at high levels of government. Then there is Christian Zionism. This is a longstanding GOP current that assigns theological meaning to supporting Israel and folds it into the civilizational battle frame. (PBS) It is also described as anti-semetic by critics.

   • Gender-order movements - Red-pill, anti-feminist, “men going their own way,” and influencer manosphere stuff are on-ramps for younger men. They supply a micro-enemy (“feminism destroyed the family”) that snaps neatly into Christian-nationalist and postliberal calls to restore patriarchal family structures. This maps on to Machismo and ultra Chauvanism.

   • White-identitarian and fascist-adjacent youth - This includes Groypers/America First types: overtly Christian-coded, racially hierarchical, entryist — and now clearly tied up with Jan-6-era militancy through shared spaces and narratives. They launder harder white-supremacist ideas into more memeable, populist formats. (Just Security)

   • Paramilitary & lone-actor white supremacy - Militia groups that rallied to Trump in 2020–21 (Proud Boys, Oath Keepers) proved they would mobilize for an explicitly partisan cause. Alongside them sits the low-organization inspiration channel: people radicalized by Great Replacement or related white-supremacist conspiracies who carry out shootings or plots; DHS, DoJ, and researchers have been linking that rhetoric to actual violence. (PBS)

   • Anti-education / anti-expert / school-capture efforts - Because universities, public schools, libraries, and DEI offices are seen as the “Cathedral,” there are real campaigns to defund, ban books, regulate curricula, or even abolish the federal education department — which Project 2025 explicitly floats. It’s social engineering through de-institutionalizing “their” institutions. (Them)

3. Economic Dimension: This one’s messy because there are two right-wing stories running at once. Fundamentally, it’s instrumental statism in the service of a right-wing social order.

   • Techno-feudalist / NRx-flavored policy: Markets for us, hierarchy for everyone else. Deregulate innovation, weaken administrative/state guardrails that slow capital or AI, and favor private or quasi-private sovereign enclaves. Yet, they are happy to use protectionism or friend-shoring if it shores up the national/civilizational project — e.g. trade and investment with aligned right-populist regimes (for example, subsidies for Milei and other right wing governments) over liberal ones. The rules change depending on loyalty. (Institut Montaigne)

   • NatCon / MAGA industrialism - Project 2025 and NatCon writers argue for industrial policy, tariffs, immigration restriction, and sometimes even antitrust against “woke” or China-linked firms — a big break from 1980s small-government conservatism. It’s economic nationalism in service of the same cultural/religious restoration. (Wikipedia)

   • Punitive economics for enemies - Because the whole worldview is conspiratorial, it easily justifies using the state to cut funds to universities, blue states, “woke” corporations, or media — economics as a weapon in the culture war. Project 2025’s remodeling of federal agencies would make that easier. (American Civil Liberties Union)

4. Cultural / Ideological Dimension

   • Conspiracy culture as connective tissue - The Deep state explains why MAGA loses or gets blocked. QAnon gives it a cosmic good-vs-evil frame, plus a participatory “research” culture, and directly tied itself to pro-Trump politics and 2020 info-war. (Encyclopedia Britannica) Great Replacement supplies a racial-demographic emergency that justifies extreme border, deportation, or even violent responses, and extremist organizations explicitly name it. (PBS) These stories are modular; Christian nationalists can plug them in; militias can plug them in; NatCon staffers can borrow the “deep state” part to argue for Schedule F.

   • Apocalyptic eschatology / spiritual-war aesthetics - This is very important because it makes compromise look sinful. If the other side is literally a satanic cabal (QAnon’s language) or a regime oppressing God’s people (Christian nationalism), then maximal, even extra-legal action looks righteous. (PBS)

   • Anti-modern, “radical traditionalist” style - Monarchism, trad Catholicism, even the online “return” memes: they give people an aesthetic of hierarchy, order, masculinity, and liturgy that’s the opposite of liberal, pluralist, queer-friendly modernity. That’s why they blend so easily with the gender-war stuff.

   • Anti-science / anti-intellectual current - Because universities, public-health agencies, and climate scientists are perceived as part of the same captured info-regime, rejecting them is proof of loyalty to the movement. This is reinforced by Q-style “do your own research” and by claims that experts are consciously hiding truth. (J Am Acad Psychiatry Law)

   • Culture-war governance - The bans on DEI, attacks on LGBTQ+ rights, library fights, and efforts to dismantle the Department of Education in Project 2025 are the policy expression of that culture. They show the right is now very comfortable using the state to reshape culture — the opposite of old “small government” talk. (Them)

Putting it together, politically, they want a more centralized, leader-driven state they control (MAGA + Project 2025 + anti-deep-state purges). Socially, they want to reinstall a Christian-patriarchal, racially hierarchical order, enforced not only by churches and families but also by school boards, statehouses, and, at the hard edge, militias. (Department of Justice) Economically, they want markets and innovation for insiders but are happy to use tariffs, friend-shoring, and punitive regulation to punish enemies or protect the nation. Culturally, they live in a shared conspiratorial narrative — deep state, replacement, cabal — that tells them we’re in a terminal struggle, so extreme measures are warranted. That’s why the militant and the buttoned-up DC versions of the right can still recognize each other as part of the same project. This is far different than traditional conservative politics. In fact, the conservative party is essentially devoid of all traditional conservatism. Mike Pence is the enemy in this view.

I think this is a fair description of the current state of conservative politics. But we should also consider some of the types of events that led to this moment and figures that spearheaded this radicalism. Next we will look at lineage map showing how various figures fed momentum—organizationally, rhetorically, and ideologically—into today’s MAGA/right-wing constellation we outlined above. This is obviously something that is open to serious historical investigation; I wouldn't possibly be able to give a comprehensive view of the history leading to this moment. But I think you can generally bucket various historical trends into one of these few categories listed below, along with figures within each bucket that were vocal.

1. Segregation → “states’ rights” → GOP realignment: Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms normalized a hard anti–civil rights, anti-LGBTQ, anti-arts public policy style that later culture-war governance builds on. (Encyclopedia Britannica) Strom Thurmond gives us the states’-rights/civil-rights backlash template. In 1948, he was a Dixiecrat presidential candidate, running on explicit segregation. A few of his notable moves: a record 24h+ filibuster against the 1957 Civil Rights Act; consistent votes against 1964–65 civil-rights laws. (The American Presidency Project) He supplied the language (“states’ rights,” anti-federal overreach) and tactics later used to fight Voting Rights expansion, civil-rights enforcement, and today’s DEI/education rollbacks. Media still mark his 1957 filibuster as the symbolic peak of that resistance. (The Washington Post)

2. Jesse Helms → culture-war governance and institutional combat - Helms was the architect of Senate hardline conservatism (1973–2003); led attacks on LGBTQ rights and abortion; turned the NEA into a national punching bag (Mapplethorpe/Serrano fights) and pushed statutory limits on arts funding. (Encyclopedia Britannica) Today’s book bans, university takeovers, and proposals to kill or weaponize cultural agencies reprise Helms’s “use the state to discipline culture” playbook. (Note how current NEA/NEH fights echo his frames.) (AP News)

3. “America First” nationalism: Pat Buchanan (with Sam Francis as theorist) fused immigration restriction, protectionism, and a religiously coded culture war—direct precursors of Trumpist MAGA and NatCon programs. (Voices of Democracy) He created the mobilization machine of the Christian right. He built CBN, ran for president (1988), then founded the Christian Coalition (1989) that perfected church-based voter registration, voter guides, and school-board/state-house capture strategies. (EBSCO) This normalized evangelical direct entry into GOP politics and made “religious war for the soul of America” a mainstream posture—precisely the soil where Christian nationalism and Seven Mountains organizing flourished. (Christian Science Monitor) He also engineered programmatic “America First” rhetoric and prime-time culture war. Some notable events include his 1992 RNC “culture war” speech; 1996/2000 runs marrying immigration restriction, trade protectionism, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-liberal internationalism under an America First banner. (Voices of Democracy) He previewed MAGA’s platform and tone, while mainstreaming the constituency Sam Francis theorized—disaffected “Middle American Radicals.” Even sympathetic analysts describe Buchanan as the first GOP populist to center immigration/trade the way Trump later did. (Carnegie Endowment)

4. Movement infrastructure: Pat Robertson professionalized evangelical mobilization (Christian Coalition, voter guides), supplying the ground game and frames used by today’s Christian-nationalist right. (EBSCO) Sam Francis was the movement’s theorist of grievance and state capture. Francis was a Paleocon strategist/columnist who coined “anarcho-tyranny” (the state harasses normals while letting real criminals run free) and popularized Middle American Radicals as a target base. Advised Buchanan. (Chronicles) His frames saturate MAGA talk shows and policy white papers: “the regime/managerial elites,” zero-sum identity conflict, and the case for a tough executive to crush the hostile bureaucracy—all central to Project 2025 style arguments. (Even critics trace a direct intellectual line from Francis to Trumpism.) (theunpopulist.net) Sam Francis gave the vocabulary and strategy (“Middle American Radicals,” “anarcho-tyranny”) now echoed across MAGA media and policy talk. (First Things)

5. White-power mainstreaming attempts: David Duke’s statewide runs showed how overt white supremacy could rebrand and test the GOP’s boundaries—an outer edge that later internet-native groups exploited. (Wikipedia) He was a Former KKK leader who won a Louisiana House seat, then ran high-profile statewide campaigns in 1990 (Senate) and 1991 (Governor), forcing national Republicans to publicly repudiate him even as he drew large protest-votes by reframing white-power themes as “rights for the white majority.” (Wikipedia) He demonstrated how white-identity rhetoric could be laundered into “mainstream” complaint politics—an edge case that foreshadowed later alt-right/groyper entryism and the normalization of “replacement” talk in mass media debates. (The New Republic)

Buchanan/Francis provided the agenda (nationalist economics + immigration restriction + cultural counter-revolution) for modern conservatism. The Helms/Thurmond model justify hardball use of institutions to enforce it. Robertson supplies the mobilization infrastructure. That package maps straight onto contemporary unitary-executive/“Schedule F” efforts and the Project 2025 governance blueprint. (Wikipedia) Buchanan’s prime-time “religious war” rhetoric + Helms’s anti-NEA crusades created the template for governing through culture war—now visible in DEI bans, school wars, and arts/education defunding pushes. (Voices of Democracy) Duke’s electoral bids showed the overlap between grievance populism and explicit white supremacy. Today’s militia/groyper/accelerationist layer exploits the same grievances; meanwhile, mainstream actors adopt sanitized versions (e.g., “invasion” rhetoric), keeping the ecosystem connected while formally disavowing its extremes (while simultaneously dog whisteling to the radical elements). (Wikipedia) Francis’s “anarcho-tyranny” and “managerial elite” frames became today’s “deep state/Cathedral” meme-plex—perfectly compatible with Q-style cabal stories and with bureaucratic purge proposals from NatCon/Heritage circles. (New York Magazine) Robertson’s church-based politics marries seamlessly to Christian nationalism’s Seven Mountains goals, giving the social base and scripture-coded justification for wielding state power in the culture war (book bans, anti-LGBTQ policy, university purges). (EBSCO)

If you picture today’s right as a network, these figures are its roots:

• Thurmond/Helms—institutional hardball to resist egalitarian reforms;
• Robertson—movement infrastructure and a sacred narrative;
• Buchanan—a nationalist platform and the televised culture war;
• Francis—the theory linking grievance to state power;
• Duke—the boundary-pushing of white supremacy into electoral frames.

Together they built the repertoire—ideas, emotions, and tactics—that MAGA, NatCon, Christian nationalists, tech-reactionaries, and the militia/online radical fringes now leverage. There are many books that go into depth on this topic, I am merely scratching the surface. I just wanted to demonstrate that this Trump phenomena did not emerge out of a vaccum. There is a path dependency from multiple movements dating back to the 1950's that began to converge under the same banner around 2016 with the Trump presidency. An interesting book that elaborates in more detail is The Shadow Gospel: How Anti-liberal Demonology Possessed U.S. Religion, Media, and Politics; I highly recommend this read.

Now that I have covered the current composition and historical trends leading to our current moment, I want to briefly discuss the type of rhetoric that is used by the current right wing. There is a distinctive rhetorical tone and distinct content used by fascist movements; something that Stanley discusses in depth. One such tool is the conspiracy theory. The Nazis were obsessed with conspiracies actually; and more often than not conspiracies are created and leveraged for political mobilization purposes. Quassim Cassam elaborates on this political aspect of conspiracy theory. So now, I want to discuss a few conspiracy theories that have become normal political discussion within the past decade: what they are, where they come from, how they show up in public arguments, and the cluster of adjacent conspiracies that travel with them. These conspiracies are often used as mobilizing narratives by current right wing politics.

1. The Great Replacement: This is a white-nationalist conspiracy theory asserting that “elites” are deliberately replacing white, native-born populations (in Europe or the U.S.) with immigrants and minorities to dilute or destroy “Western” culture and political power. French writer Renaud Camus popularized the slogan Le Grand Remplacement in 2011, but the theme recycles older “white genocide” panics. (Wikipedia) The “replacement/white genocide” frame borrows directly from racist and antisemitic traditions that cast Jews as masterminds behind immigration and social change; Nazi ideology fused similar claims into its worldview. In the U.S., neo-Nazi David Lane helped mainstream the “white genocide” variant in the 1990s. (Reuters) The idea has been cited or echoed by multiple terrorists (Christchurch 2019, El Paso 2019, Buffalo 2022). (Wikipedia) It does not often show up in its explicit form; but there are tell-tale forms that reoccur in public argument:

   • “Demographic destiny” and birth-rate panic: framing immigration or minority birth rates as an existential threat. (Wikipedia)
   • “Invasion” language and importing voters claims (that parties deliberately change the electorate via immigration). (PBS)
   • Soft-pedaled versions: “cultural replacement,” “heritage under siege,” or “we’re being outvoted,” avoiding explicit race terms while implying the same logic. (ISD)
   • White genocide (Lane’s formulation), Eurabia (Europe “Islamized”), and the Kalergi Plan (a hoax alleging an EU plot to “replace” Europeans). (Wikipedia)
   • ZOG (“Zionist-Occupied Government”), an openly antisemitic variant claiming Jews control governments. (Wikipedia)

2. The Great Reset - This is actually a World Economic Forum (WEF) post-COVID program (June 2020) arguing for a greener, more resilient recovery and “stakeholder capitalism.” That’s the official initiative. (World Economic Forum) It became a conspiracy when online actors reframed “Great Reset” as a master plan by “globalist elites” to seize private property, impose digital control, or run “climate lockdowns.” Fact-checkers and the WEF have repeatedly debunked common claims (e.g., “you’ll own nothing,” fake WEF memos). The viral “own nothing” slogan traces to a speculative 2016 essay; it’s been ripped from context as if it were a WEF goal. (Reuters) The Reset narrative isn’t inherently white-supremacist, but it’s often blended with older antisemitic tropes about a shadowy “global cabal,” and it cross-pollinates with Great Replacement / “globalist” rhetoric in the same ecosystems. (World Jewish Congress) You'll see this in various forms:

   • Property seizure / “you’ll own nothing” claims (misread of the 2016 piece). (Reuters)
   • Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) = social credit, digital IDs, ESG and “15-minute cities” presented as tools of population control. (Example: claims that 15-minute cities are about confining people; fact-checkers show it’s basic urban planning.) (AP News)

3. “Cultural Marxism” - It says that a network of leftist academics (often the Frankfurt School) infiltrated culture to destroy religion, family, and “Western values,” replacing class struggle with identity politics. (Wikipedia) The frame updates Nazi-era “Cultural Bolshevism” and “Judeo-Bolshevism”—propaganda that tied modern art, feminism, and liberalism to a Jewish-Marxist plot. Post-1990s U.S. conservatives (e.g., William S. Lind/Paul Weyrich) popularized the modern label “cultural Marxism,” explicitly targeting the Frankfurt School. (Wikipedia) Tthe Frankfurt School was actually diverse scholarly project in critical social theory, not a covert plan to control institutions. (Useful overview from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) But you'll often hear moral panics about "critical theory" teaching our kids to "hate America" (a justification for "patriotic education" enforced by the federal government). You'll see this in a few forms:

   • Portraying DEI, feminism, LGBTQ rights, or CRT as parts of a single “Marxist” cultural conspiracy (Red Scare). (Wikipedia)
   • Invoking a “long march through the institutions” (a 1960s radical slogan) as proof of infiltration—usually stripped of context (Ironically, this is precisely what they have been doing). (Wikipedia)
   • Casting academia, media, and the arts as occupied “woke” outposts in a civilizational war. (See early SPLC coverage of how this meme entered U.S. right-wing discourse.) (Southern Poverty Law Center)

These ideas intermix and mutate. Typical satellites include:

• “Globalist”/Soros cabal (classic antisemitic frame updated with a contemporary villain). (AJC)
• Agenda 21/2030 as a secret blueprint to end private property or impose a one-world government. (Fact-checked—no.) (Reuters)
• Eurabia / Kalergi Plan / ZOG (regionalized “replacement” myths; explicitly antisemitic variants). (Wikipedia)
• “15-minute cities” cast as mobility prisons; insect-eating and meat bans framed as elite social engineering; CBDCs and digital IDs as tools for surveillance—often bundled with “Great Reset” branding. (AP News)

Across all three, we see the same themes:

1. A hidden mastermind (often coded as “globalists,” frequently sliding into antisemitic tropes). (World Jewish Congress)
2. Apocalyptic stakes (“civilization collapse,” “extinction,” “enslavement”). (Wikipedia)
3. Plausible-deniability language (switching from race to “culture,” from seizure to “you’ll own nothing”). (Wikipedia)
4. Policy piggybacking—ordinary proposals (zoning, ESG reporting, demographic reports) recast as proof of a plot. (United Nations)

A quick recap on what we have done so far. We have shown the current composition of the modern right and its rhetorical tactics, plus a partial historical trajectory, leading to what many people are calling fascist. So given this background, let's reask the question: to what degree is Trump or this movement Fascist, according to definitions and characterizations given by scholars, and actual facts of the current movement? I want to make a case that Trump/Vance and their close network of people like Peter Thiel, Kevin Roberts of the Heritage Foundation (author of project 2025), Leonard Leo and his connections with Opus Dei, the growing Radical Traditionalism (Rad Trad) elements of the right, the fucking ghoul Stephen Miller, Charles Koch, Tyler Cowen, Curtis Yarvin, Richard Hanania, and Simone and Malcolm Collins, the PayPal mafia, and generally the red pill movement who’s interwoven with this entire thing, resemble fascism to an alarming degree, specifically Francoist fascism. Michael Knowles, a massive Trump loyalist and influencer in the alt-right, outright praised the Spanish fascist dictator Francisco Franco. Leaders in the White House like Michael Anton openly claim to have studied the writings of the fascist intellectual Carl Schmitt. Russell Vought, a very influential person within the Trump regime, is a staunch proponent of the deeply authoritarian Unitary Executive Theory and is arguably a Christian Nationalist. Given Trumps proximity to this network of people, his palingenetic myth rhetoric, and the fervor among radical parts of his core voter base (the revolutionary aspect of fascism), I think it's not unreasonable to conclude with high probability Trump is a fascist or a fascist sympathizer; or is at least considered to be a useful figure for these other fascists to advance their views. Some of the names I've listed provide the intellectual justification for their movement. Some of them are market fundamentalists, representing the economic policy aspect of the movement, some of them are cultural commentators, some of them are legal professionals with massive influence, and some of them are just downright degenerates.

Feature of Francoism	Resonance in the Trump/Vance extended ecosystem
Clerical-fascist alliance with Catholicism (Opus Dei, Falangism)	Leonard Leo, Opus Dei connections, traditionalist Catholic intellectuals
Reaction against modernity, feminism, secularism	Red pill movement, anti-LGBT rhetoric, defense of patriarchy
Authoritarian, anti-liberal state-building	Project 2025, administrative state overhaul, Heritage Foundation plans
Technocratic authoritarianism	Peter Thiel, Tyler Cowen, Curtis Yarvin embrace of post-democratic governance models
Suppression of pluralism via legalism	Judicial strategies from the Federalist Society, Leonard Leo’s court-packing network
No mass party like Nazism but elite control via institutions	This network is elite-driven, institutionally focused (courts, think tanks, capital)

This is not Nazi-style fascism; it is corporate-clerical-technocratic authoritarianism, what some call “managerial fascism.” Here is a bit more about the key figures in this movement:

• J.D. Vance: Positions himself as a post-liberal populist and “realist” about class and culture. Spews Anti-elitist rhetoric, but aligned with elite authoritarian capital. He is open to Curtis Yarvin's monarchist/accelerationist thought and is Red pill-adjacent, sympathetic to manosphere and traditionalist gender politics. Oh, and he outright claimed that “Professors are the enemy”, and is accelerating Trumps war on higher education.
• Peter Thiel: Funds both libertarian techno-authoritarianism and Catholic integralism. He is a backer of Vance, Blake Masters, and “startup government” ideologies and advocates for a post-democratic elite rule, suggesting “freedom and democracy are not compatible”. He also wrote an article titled “Competition is for losers”, in which he advocates for monopoly control, while simultaneously gaslighting everyone into thinking he is pro-market,
• Leonard Leo / Opus Dei: Leader of the Federalist Society, an institution that has had an incredible influence on the Supreme Court. He has deep ties to reactionary Catholicism, including Opus Dei and seeks to impose moral-authoritarian governance through the courts. Oh and he is the fucking Architect of Project 2025, an authoritarian administrative blueprint for Trump.
• Curtis Yarvin (Mencius Moldbug): Advocate for neocameralist monarchy, i.e. replacing democracy with corporate CEO-rule. He is deeply anti-egalitarian, anti-Enlightenment, hierarchical in his thinking. He serves as a thought-leader for a reactionary elite renaissance. Not only that, during his blogging days Yarvin praised the Norweigen mass shooter Anders Behring Breivik, a right wing extremist who killed 77 people; 8 in a bombing in Oslo and 69 in a mass shooting at a Labour Party youth camp. Yarvin wrote “The indisputable humanity of Anders Behring Breivik,” in which he praises the shooter’s actions and ideology. He called him a hero.
• Hanania / Cowen / Collinses / PayPal Mafia: Embrace or enable racial realism, eugenics, market absolutism, or anti-democratic governance. They use intellectualized framing to sanitize dangerous social engineering ideas and are connected by networks of funding and podcast circuits (e.g., Thiel money, Substack echo chambers)

This is closer to Francoism or Salazarism: elite-led, religiously moralistic, anti-democratic, and institutionally focused authoritarianism.

Trait	Evidence in Trump/Vance circle
Traditionalist gender roles and patriarchy	Red pill ideology, pronatalism, Simone and Malcolm Collins’ movement
National rebirth through cultural purification	Anti-woke crusades, educational takeovers, "de-wokify the military"
Anti-egalitarianism and hierarchical order	Yarvin’s monarchy, Hanania’s racial realism, Cowen’s “talentism”
Clerical-reactionary moral vision	Opus Dei, Leo's judicial agenda, defense of “Christian America”
Anti-democratic populism	Electoral distrust, Vance's attacks on pluralism, Thiel's rejection of democracy
Technocratic illiberalism	Fusion of tech libertarianism with autocratic state vision
Administrative revolution	Project 2025’s plan to fire civil servants and impose loyalty tests
Conspiracy Theory	Deliberate use of far right conspiracy theories for mass mobilization
Scapegoating and Othering	Rhetoric about "True American", anti-immigration, revoking citizenship

And lets not forget to mention the massive Christian Nationalist movement at the core of this. Influential pastors who more or less adhere to the Seven Mountains Mandate, like Douglas Wilson and Joel Webbon, are theocratic and authoritarian to their very core, have a growing network of supporters, and are fervent supporters of Trump; quite frankly committing the sin of have a false idol. Among their congregations, and many other conservative evangelical denominations, it's common to hear political discourse framed as a "spiritual battle". Many, quite literally, believe anyone left of them is demonic, or influenced by Satan. This level of "othering" and dehumanization is obviously a common feature of Fascism. Dominion theology is inherently authoritarian; and this makes up the most significant voting block of the Trump regime. There is a growing number of people in this cluster that claim "slavery was not that bad" and that "MLK was actually a bad person". Many are fervently anti-civil rights and would very much prefer to redact the 14th and 19th amendments.

So I acknowledge this is not a perfect match, but a defeasible, cumulative case. Given what we have discussed thus far when defining and conceptualizing fascism, I think the parallels are quite striking. Trump/Vance and their network represent a 21st-century elite-driven, clerical-technocratic variant of fascism, more akin to Francoist or Salazarist authoritarianism rather than Nazi-style mass mobilization. It is an ideology of “cultural restoration,” fused with market authoritarianism and religious traditionalism, operating through courts, think tanks, capital, and digital media rather than street violence like the Black Shirts in the 20th century. This maps on to many of the aspects uncovered from the scholars above. The market authoritarianism seems to perfectly map on to Mattei's analysis of capitalist reaction.

Someone can read this and disagree with me, because they reject the definitions advanced by Griffin, Stanley, Eco, Mattei, Paxton etc. They could also disagree with my hypothetical methodology for identifying a fascist. But that's the point of this entire post: defining political terminology like fascism is necessarily complex. A triangle, by definition, is a mathematical structure with three angles. Take away one angle, you do not have a triangle. It's embedded into the term itself: tri(three)-angle. Fascism will never be amenable to an "objective" definition like this; it is a patterned phenomena intimately connected to moral condemnation. That does not mean the term is vacuous; it means we need to be critical thinkers.

Conclusion

Requesting an unambiguous definition often misses the point. Obviously definitions are starting points for inquiry and are contestable, but some people take this to mean "it is all subjective", and therefore the concept "fascism" does not exist.  People often treat a definition as if its only job were a perfect membership test (necessary + sufficient conditions). If it can’t do that, they conclude either the concept is “just subjective,” or it’s “meaningless,” or it’s “just an insult.”  That’s a category mistake about what concepts (especially in history and social science) are for. Many concepts are tools for inquiry, not just labels. A good concept can be contestable yet still truth-apt (some uses better than others), open-textured yet still non-arbitrary (anchored by evidence and patterns), and plural (multiple valid operationalizations) without being “anything goes.”

The "no strict definition" to "no fact of the matter" inference is a non-sequitur. We have plenty of examples of definitions that are not universally perfect, but can nevertheless be extremely useful for inquiry and investigation. For example, what is the definition of life? There’s no universally perfect definition that cleanly handles viruses, prions, borderline cases, hypothetical artificial life, etc. Yet biologists identify living things reliably and can give better or worse accounts depending on explanatory fruitfulness. We lack a strict definition of "justice" that settles all disputes, yet we can identify paradigms (show trials vs. due process), build institutions, and argue non-arbitrarily from principles and outcomes. These show a key point: concepts can be real and objective enough for inquiry even when they’re not capturable by strict necessary-and-sufficient conditions. Borderlines don’t erase cores; contestability doesn’t imply meaninglessness. We identified a range of definition strategies. Some of which include:

1. Ideal Type definition: “What is the one core recurring property without which it isn’t fascism?”
2. Cluster / typological characterization: “What family of traits tends to come together, and in what configurations?”
3. Mechanistic / developmental model: “What causal dynamics generate the phenomenon, and how does it evolve as it interacts with institutions?”

None of these is “more real” in the abstract. They answer different questions. For boundary questions the minimalist cores help, for comparative questions, typologies help and for explanatory/historical questions lifecycle/mechanism models help. So someone demanding a perfect boundary-test and then claiming the concept is “just vibes” when it fails is basically demanding the wrong tool for the job. These are not "subjective"; they are fallible, revisable, and evidence governed. 

Fascism isn’t “meaningless” because it resists a single airtight definition. It’s a complex historical phenomenon with ideological content (Griffin), patterned syndromes of organization/style/goals (Payne), recurring functionality (Eco/Stanley), very possibly connected with economic structure (Mattei), that evolves (Sunshine), and has recurring mechanisms and developmental pathways (Paxton). Treating it like a term that must behave like a clean natural-kind label (with strict necessary/sufficient conditions) is the mistake. And then declaring “there’s no fact of the matter” is a second mistake piled on top of the first.

At the end of the day, it's kind of irrelevant whether "Trump is a Fascist". The fact that we are having this discussion implies that he's significantly associated with authoritarianism and anti-democracy. The form of this authoritarianism will be historically unique; given the history, structure, culture, and techno-economic state of the US. I'm not sure how bad things will become, but I don't think we should be stifled from action based on "whether he is fascist". He, his cronies, and dogmatic supporters are bad, full stop.

More Resources:

1. Definitions - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2. Logical Construction - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
3. "Ur Fascism" by Umberto Eco
4. "The Five Stages of Fascism" by Robert Paxton
5. prof. Stanley Payne - Fascism and its derivations
6. Adorno on Right-Wing Extremism in Late Capitalism
7. How to Make a Fascist
8. The Roots of Austerity and 20th Century Fascism (feat. Clara Mattei)