The Modal Ontological Argument
In prior posts, I've written about how absurd I think this argument is. Its an argument that, if you have no familiarity with philosophical logic, it appears obvious if you are already a theist. If you have any familiarity with this kind of argumentation, it's quite dubious. This polarizing nature is interesting to me because I think it highlights problems with using philosophical argumentation to persuade anyone of anything under conditions of deep disagreement (and generally, the uses of argumentation by rational agents with differing hinge commitments ). The paper " Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement " is where my thoughts are currently with regard to this question; specifically with respect to arguments for the existence of a god. Are we fundamentally disagreeing about arational beliefs , and if so, what is the relationship between hinge commitments and trust ? Are theistic beliefs knowledge-apt beliefs or folk-beliefs ? This is an active area of...